Cessation of overseas training arrangements by developed countries as a result of their disapproval of Pakistan’s nuclear tests has not seriously affected professional knowledge or standards, but officers are now denied exposure to the wider horizons offered by such nations. Western influence has been reduced to the point of creating significant resentment, especially at junior level. Increased anti-Western feelings have been manipulated by a small number of zealots within and outside the armed forces in an attempt to attract adherents to more rigid forms of Islam than is desired by senior officers, and the West.
Equipment and mobility
US military co-operation and supply of equipment stopped in October 1990 after US President George Bush refused to sign an annual declaration that Pakistan was not involved in a nuclear programme. (The USA was aware that Pakistan had such a programme for many years but after Russia’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War, Pakistan was less useful to the US as an ally. Sanctions followed.) After some relaxation, strictures were reimposed in totality following Pakistan’s nuclear tests in May 1998. Results have been:
+ the movement of Pakistan further towards China and North Korea as suppliers and, in the case of the PRC, co-producer, of weapons systems;
+ the clandestine acquisition of equipment and spare parts worldwide;
+ an increased domestic production of spare parts and ammunition; and
+ heightened anti-Americanism in all services, but mainly and markedly amongst junior army officers. This is spilling-over into general anti-Western sentiment.
Fortunately for the army, Pakistan declined to purchase the US Abrams main battle tank (MBT) when it was offered in 1988. (It was following a demonstration of the Abrams that Pakistan’s ruler, General Zia ul Haq, left the firing range at Bahawalpur in a Pakistan Air Force C-130 that crashed in mysterious circumstances, killing him, the US ambassador, the US defence sales representative and 20 senior officers.) Had the Abrams been obtained, a large part of the Armoured Corps, including the strike corps, would now be facing grave difficulties.
Reliance was placed on obtaining Chinese tanks, including the Norinco Type 85 (125mm smoothbore), of which over 400 are in service. Pakistan improved the current inventory by undertaking a major rebuild/ upgrade programme at Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT, near Rawalpindi, improved and extended the tanks with significant PRC assistance). There has also been gradual development, with China, of a new tank, the MBT 2000 or ‘Khalid’; and the acquisition, beginning in 1997, of 320 T-80UD tanks from Ukraine at a cost of US$650m. The last of these were delivered at the end of 1999.
The introduction of newer and rebuilt tanks has taken pressure off the Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME), which was having difficulty maintaining older equipment for front-line use. Type 85s and T-80s form the major part of strike forces, with the work-horse Type 59 (105mm, upgraded), Type 69 (Centaur FCS), and M-48A5s in other units. Technology from the UK, Sweden and Belgium has resulted in improvement in advanced tank (and artillery) ammunition, which is produced in increasing quantities by Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) for domestic use and growing exports.
The Khalid MBT (120mm) four-phase programme appears successful, if slow. Its measured pace results from a combination of policy, and non-availability of systems and sub-systems from Western nations. The power pack (UK Challenger) and transmission (French Leclerc) were deemed satisfactory, but the outcome of negotiations on long-term development is unknown as there is pressure within the British government to cease defence co-operation with Pakistan. The programme contrasts favourably with the India’s Arjun MBT project.
It appears that for the moment Pakistan could have a qualitative and even a quantitative edge over Indian armour, as Russian T-90 MBTs performed badly in trials last year in India, and acquisition is yet to be confirmed. Refurbishment of India’s 1,500 T-72s is well behind schedule, and there are critical maintenance and upgrading problems. The Arjun MBT has been ordered only in token number (124, with delivery to start in 2001). These problems, set against Pakistan’s novel armour tactics, improved air-to-ground co-operation, flexible command structure at corps and below, and a more structured approach to procurement and production, might point to a military balance less in India’s favour than bald inventories would seem to show.
Pakistan has a deficiency in mobility. There are too few armoured personnel carriers and self-propelled guns, both medium (155mm) and air defence (AD), to properly equip all formations. There are only 900 M113s available (most produced at HIT under licence). Both their production and armoured infantry fighting vehicle development have been affected by sanctions. The 155mm self-propelled (SP) artillery, essential for support in the fast-moving battles likely during the advance of the strike formations and in countering similar Indian thrust(s) into Pakistan, is limited to a dozen regiments-worth of US M-109s. In spite of US embargoes, spares are bought on the world market, with some manufactured at POF. As the barrels are well within their first quarter of life, there is no pressing need for replacement. The problem is in enlarging the holding, as the USA is an unreliable supplier. There is no compatibility between the M-109 and the likely alternative, the Norinco 122mm SP gun.
Air defence
Until the early 1990s the army paid insufficient attention to co-operation with the air force. Joint exercises were few, and were more demonstrations than tests. During obstacle crossings, soldiers from divisional air defence regiments were used as guides, making far bank AD almost negligible as there were no procedures for marrying-up troops with equipments after lodgement. They would also be so tired as to make them ineffective at the very time of major air threat.
Tactical liaison with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was poor or non-existent and the risk of mistaken engagement of own troops was unacceptably high. Procedures for ‘weapons tight’ were not practised.
Creation of Air Defence Command, consisting of 3 anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) Groups (8 brigades), and emphasis on joint co-operation and training has gone far to rectify the unsatisfactory position. However, much remains to be done. Unfortunately for the army and the PAF, budget restrictions have cut the number of exercises that are necessary to practise and refine procedures to the required degree, although computer and dry training is conducted. Most equipments are towed guns, but study of AAA tactics worldwide has resulted in doctrine based on local airspace saturation. Hand-held/vehicle-mounted surface-to-air missiles, including Stinger, RBS-70 (180 launchers) and Chinese HN-5, are deployed mainly in strike units, and the cheaply produced Anza infra-red homing missile, a SA-7 ‘Grail’ surface-to-air missile copy, is in wide service.
Nuclear units
Since the formation of the first ‘Composite Missile Regiment’ at Kharian, near Lahore, in 1989, there has been exercise and development of tactical missile doctrine. However, procedures are as yet by no means effective. The army as a whole is unaware of nuclear doctrine.
A recent test of the indigenous Hatf 1A missile (February) and information concerning warhead miniaturisation seems to indicate that this 100km battlefield weapon may be at the stage where the motor assembly could be married to a nuclear warhead. There is a new launcher, and it is assessed that the missile is now deployable in unit strength, probably in four batteries each of two launchers. Other missile units have been formed, and training has taken place since 1994 for employment of the Chinese M-11 surface-to-surface missile (SSM), designed for nuclear warhead carriage. It may have this capability in Pakistan service. The Ghauri missile, supplied by North Korea, is intended for nuclear use, but it is unlikely that Pakistan has produced such a warhead yet. Pakistan’s short-range nuclear SSM capability is more advanced than that of India.
Fitness for role
The Pakistan Army has many problems, including denial of spares for US equipments, shortage of junior officers, an old-fashioned higher command system, less mobility than desirable, increasing distrust of the West by junior officers, and, currently, the siphoning-off of high-grade officers and junior ranks to civilian tasks. However, it has high morale, excellent leadership, good tactics, adequate equipment and the will to win. It is hoped it will never have to prove its effectiveness. +
PARAMILITARY FORCES
There are two main paramilitary groups and five essentially civilian organisations with police-style functions.
The Frontier Corps (FC) is about 65,000 strong and is divided in two elements: FC Balochistan (south) and FC North West Frontier Province (NWFP) (north), each commanded by an army two-star, titled Inspector General.
The two forces have different emphasis: FC Balochistan concentrates more on anti-smuggling; FC NWFP on peacemaking and peacekeeping in the border and tribal areas. The FC has 11 ‘corps’ in the south and 12 in the north, with names such as the Maiwand Rifles and Ghazaband Scouts in Balochistan, and Khyber Rifles and Kurram Militia in NWFP. Each corps is commanded by a Colonel/Lieutenant Colonel, and is divided into wings commanded by majors. HQ and some other officers are also on secondment from the army for 23 years. Morale in these units is high. The soldiers know their regions and are well trained. However, they are lightly armed and tend to be robust in the internal security role out of their areas, as occurred when units were so employed in Sindh in 1992.
The Pakistan Rangers (25,00030,000) are commanded by a two star Director General and are in three commands: Mehran Force (also two star), based in Karachi, is an internal security force working under HQ 5 Corps, although theoretically answerable to the Interior Ministry; and two groups are stationed along the border with India. Tasks of the latter include protection of the border area and its inhabitants, collection of low-level intelligence concerning Indian military movements, co-operation with civil police concerning smuggling and dacoity (rural gangsterism), and guarding the sole international road crossing-point, near Lahore.
The Airport Security Force is a guard organisation responsible for security of facilities and equipment, and is commanded by a brigadier. Its training is adequate for guard, search and escort duties, but it would not be capable of defending installations against coup de main or paratroop attack.
The Frontier Constabulary of 5,000 is independent but associated with the FC NWFP and subordinate to that province government, as it works in the ’settled’ rather than the ‘tribal’ areas (in the latter, only tribal law applies).
The Balochistan Constabulary (about 2,500) performs much the same task in its province, but answers to the Interior Ministry.
The Coast Guard (about 2,000 in three battalions) performs anti-smuggling tasks. It is commanded by a brigadier and its officers are seconded from the army for about 12 months.
Levies and Khassadars are relics of colonial days, whose role is to provide some measure of policing in the tribal areas of NWFP. Their questionable effectiveness lies in belonging to local tribes and providing a measure of ‘umpiring’ between them.
The Northern Light Infantry, successor to the Gilgit and Karakoram Scouts, of 13 battalions (about 12,000 men), with its HQ in Bunji, south of Gilgit (see map), is commanded by the Force Commander Northern Areas (FCNA) and has not been subordinate to the Interior Ministry for many years other than in name. Its soldiers are locally recruited and accustomed to mountain conditions in which they perform outstandingly, but are not easily trained in advanced technology.
As most of these forces are officered by the army there is sometimes disagreement between their commanders and the Office of the Military Secretary in GHQ, Rawalpindi, which is responsible for officer management and postings. The paramilitary forces complain that they cannot perform their tasks without above-average officers, and MS Branch states that there are not enough of these to go round.
The Rangers and the Frontier Corps are most efficient in their designated fields and would be effective as guerrillas should there be general war.
MAIN REGIMENTAL AND CORPS TRAINING CENTRES INFANTRY
Azad Kashmir Regiment Attock
Baloch Regiment Abbotabad
Frontier Force Regiment Abbotabad
Punjab Regiment Mardan
Sindh Regiment Petaro
School of Infantry and Tactics Quetta
Armoured Corps Nowshera
Corps of Artillery
(Artillery centre at Attock) Nowshera
Corps of Engineers Risalpur
Army Aviation Corps Rawalpindi
Corps of Signals
(College, Rawalpindi) Kohat
Corps of Electrical & Mechanical Engineers Rawalpindi
Army Service Corps Nowshera
School of Logistics Murree
School of Army Education Murree
Command & Staff College Quetta
School of Mountain Warfare
(also Skardu) Abbotabad
Special Services Group Cherat & Attock
Parachute School Peshawar
Corps of Military Police Dera Ismail Khan