R. Bessel (Life In The Third Reich):
?While the party lost in credibility, Hitler?s star rose thanks to the ceaseless propaganda campaigns of Goebbels.?
One need only look to the 1936 Reichstag elections. B. Engelmann, In Hitler?s Germany for a fine example of this:
? [Goebbels:] ?Ninety-nine per cent of all Germans have voted for Adolf Hitler and the NSDAP!? No one in Germany was surprised. Everyone had felt the pressure; everyone knew about the harassment, manipulation, and falsification at the police stations. An entire nation had bowed to a system of terror.?
This voting was performed after ?unprecedented propaganda efforts? (Engelmann). Issues such as these call into question whether it was important whether or not people found propaganda credible or not. Was it propaganda that convinced them to vote NSDAP ? or the terror?
?Anyone who does not vote for Hitler is a traitor to the Volk!?
(Quoted in Engelmann)
It brings forth the issue that truly at the heart of the matter ? in a good number of cases it didn?t matter whether people truly believed in Hitler or simply believed Hitler. The reason for his success lay in the power that the people who did wholeheartedly believe in the Fuhrer held in their numbers, their persuasion. Quoted in Hitler?s Germany 1933-39 (Author and Publisher unknown):
??We too couldn?t opt out??
The desire to simply, on a basic and relatively passive manner, conform or ?go along? with a man who seemed to genuinely want to see Germany as one of the great superpowers: was great enough. This view lay within the area of acquiescent Nazi ?tolerators?, over whom propaganda could not exactly be defined as ?profoundly successful?, but was successful enough to the extent that people did not in any way oppose the regime. This was, in many circles, the most propaganda (whether propaganda itself be the influencing factor, or other people?s enthusiasm) that Goebbels needed to employ to help the Nazis expand towards 1939. They needed their vote.
Again, like the Hitler Youth there were areas where the Nazi parties ideology, promoted via propaganda, was not accepted.
A statement from the Confessional Church, June 1934:
?We reject the false doctrine that the state, over and above its special charge, should become the single and totalitarian order of human life, thus fulfilling the church?s mission as well.? (From The German Resistance to Hitler, edited by H. Graml, M. Mommsen et al, quoted in Hitler and Germany by William Simpson.)
In this instance, the over publication of the extent of control that Hitler and Nazis aspired to achieve led to this opposition: if Nazi aims were not made entirely clear, this public opposition would not have occurred for the rest of the German public to hear and consider joining in support: they would simply not know what the Nazis were planning to do. Although an interesting idea to consider, the problem was that in order to attain all the aims they set out to achieve (outlined in Kershaw?s diagram), the Nazis needed total public cooperation: for it was the public they were trying to affect, to do so they would need to show their entire radical nature, including the extent of their desired control, to appeal to victims of ?tired Weimar ideology?. The fact that their radical nature upset some was an acceptable margin compared to the success it generated for the Nazis and moreover for Hitler.
But it was possible to oppose the Nazi regime and win. The opposition felt toward the euthanasia programme, spearheaded by Graf Clemens August von Galen, for instance. The opposition, and von Galen in particular, was so publicly supported that Goebbels advised against his arrest. Goebbels knew better than to needlessly escalate a dangerous issue for the Nazis into something lethal. Nazi support was essential. The euthanasia programme was dropped.
These theories applied similarly to Nazi propaganda, though not to the extent of the programme being dropped altogether of course. Trade-offs were made, and individual pieces of propaganda were dropped if they proved to be in any way detrimental to the cause.
Even to the core of the creation of the ?Reich Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda? in 1933, Goebbels at the helm brought its first foray into ?transparency of propaganda? (therefore effectiveness) – Goebbels tried to have the word ?propaganda? removed from the title for obvious reasons. From the very core into every pore of German life: propaganda spoke.
To Conclude?Be it partly a ?Hitler Myth?, it cannot be disputed that the propaganda Goebbels worked for the Nazi party was largely successful.
The radical nature of the Nazi party is both what made it so dangerous for a non-Aryan to live in Germany, and so appealing to so many to be a part of: So dangerous, because it was so successful ? and so successful because of propaganda. The effective use of the technology that was at Goebbels? fingertips allowed for the free transmission of single ideas, from a single voice – into every home, every mind, every Germans every other thought. Goebbels used any effective medium he could employ efficiently, and never for the simple sake of it:
?Propaganda is not an end in itself, but a means to an end.?
?Should a new idea be badly received it would be withdrawn before it could be, in any way or any further, detrimental to the successful expansion of the Nazi party.
Particularly between 1933-39, Propaganda was used to its greatest effect to affect every German person in at least some small way. Propaganda helped the rising Nazi Party earn a stronger foothold in the consciousness of people?s thoughts ? earn a vote ? earn support.
Preparation for war, a need to prove Germany?s preparedness in terms of the psychological gearing for conflict towards 1939, or the further promotion of this, via the demonstration of the physical preparedness ? armament. The marches were a proud Nazi display of the might of the army, the cameras seeing only what Goebbels deemed suitable.
The allowing for captive audiences to hear the Fuhrer as if he were standing beside him, via newspaper and radio, what needed to be said ? was said, but most importantly, was heard.
Goebbels? propaganda was successful in rooting Hitler and his ideals for the advancement of the Nazi party (outlined in aims) into the soul of every person who sought change for the greater good of the ?fatherland?. When it did this, it set the scene to begin realising its individual goals.
?As for the overall goal?
Without Goebbels there was no Hitler.
AppendixBooks:Goebbels. Mastermind of the Third Reich: Irving, David. Focal Point Publications, 1999 (Internet edition).
Hitler and Germany: Simpson, William. Cambridge University Press.
The Hitler Myth: Kershaw, Ian. Oxford University Press, 1987.
Last Night a DJ Saved my Life: The History of the Disc Jockey: Brewster, Bill and Broughton, Frank, Headline Book Publishing, 1999.
Life In The Third Reich: Bessel, R. Oxford University Press, 1987.
Nazism – State, Economy and Society 1933-39: Noakes, Jeremy. 1984.
Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933-45: Welch, D. Oxford University Press, 1987.
A Social History Of The Third Reich: Grunberger, Richard. Penguin Books 1971.
Articles:Cartoons of the Third Reich: Coupe, W. A. History Today, 1998
Film and Photography in the Third Reich: Lenman, Dr. Robin. New Perspective, 1998
Internet:The Nazification of Germany, 1933-39
http://fcit.coedu.usf.edu/holocaust/resource/gallery/NR1935.htmPhotographs of Goebbels:
http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/biografien/GoebbelsJoseph/The Calvin College Propaganda Archive:
http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/goebmain.htm