strength of the exile forces and the anti- Castro movement within Cuba, the
post Castro government would have been totally unviable: it would have
taken constant American help to shore it up. In this matter I share the
opinion of `ambassador Ellis O. Briggs, who has written “The Bay of Pigs
operation was a tragic experience for the Cubans who took part, but its
failure was a fortunate (if mortifying) experience for the U.S., which
otherwise might have been saddled with indefinite occupation of the island.
Beyond its immediately damaging effects, the Bay of Pigs fiasco has
shown itself to have far reaching consequences. Washington’s failure to
achieve its goal in Cuba provided the catalyst for Russia to seek an
advantage and install nuclear missiles in Cuba. The resulting “missile
crisis” in 1962 was the closest we have been to thermonuclear war.
America’s gain may have been America’s loss. A successful Bay of Pigs may
have brought the United States one advantage. The strain on American
political and military assets resulting from the need to keep the lid on in
Cuba might have lid on Cuba might have led the President of the United
States to resist, rather than to enthusiastically embrace, the advice he
received in 1964 and 1965 to make a massive commitment of American air
power, ground forces, and prestige in Vietnam.
Cuban troops have been a major presence as Soviet surrogates all over
the world, notably in Angola. The threat of exportation of Castro’s
revolution permeates U.S.-Central and South American policy. (Witness the
invasion of Grenada.) This fear still dominates todays headlines. For years
the U.S. has urged support for government of El Salvador and the right wing
Contras in Nicaragua. The major concern underlying American policy in the
area is Castro’s influence. The fear of a Castro influenced regime in
South and Central America had such control of American foreign policy as to
almost topple the Presidency in the recent Iran – Contra affair. As a
result the U.S. government has once again faced a crisis which threatens to
destroy its credibility in foreign affairs. All because of one man with a
cigar.
In concluding I would like to state my own feelings on the whole affair
as they formed in researching the topic. To start, all the information I
could gather was one-sided. All the sources were American written, and
encompassed an American point of view. In light of this knowledge, and
with the advantage of hindsight, I have formulated my own opinion of this
affair and how it might have been more productively handled. American
intervention should have been held to a minimum. In an atmosphere of
concentration on purely Cuban issues, opposition to Castro’s personal
dictatorship could be expected to grow. Admittedly, even justified
American retaliation would have led to Cuban counterretaliation and so on
with the prospect that step by step the same end result would have been
attained as was in fact achieved. But the process would have lasted far
longer; measured American responses might have appeared well deserved to
an
increasing number of Cubans, thus strengthening Cuban opposition to the
regime instead of, as was the case, greatly stimulating revolutionary
fervor, leaving the Russians no choice but to give massive support to the
Revolution and fortifying the belief among anti-Castro Cubans that the
United States was rapidly moving to liberate them. The economic pressures
available to the United States were not apt to bring Castro to his knees,
since the Soviets were capable of meeting Cuban requirements in such
matters as oil and sugar. I believe the Cuban government would have been
doomed by its own disorganization and incompetence and by the growing
disaffection of an increasing number of the Cuban people. Left to its own
devices, the Castro regime would have withered on the vine.