The new technological advance could spark an arms race in missiles in the
region. Rubin also stated in this briefing that the United States does believe
that the August 31st incident was a failed satellite launch attempt. CNN
reports, however, show that little progress was made. The talks, held behind
closed doors in Geneva, gave way to North Korea demanding the immediate removal
of 37,000 U.S. troops from South Korea. Washington reportedly rejected this .
Recent developments in North Korea have been focused mainly on the massive
famine that is plaguing the country. With North Korea only able to produce
two-thirds of the minimum supply of food it needs, it has been reported that
thousands of people are dying of hunger and diseases. A CNN report on November
9, 1998 stated that the North Korean government asked the United States for cash
as a condition of allowing an American mission visit to Pyongyang for talks on a
suspected underground nuclear site. Spokesman James Rubin responded to this,
?And given that kind of posture (referring to the offer of money for
visitation rights), it?s why we don?t expect to see this resolved, because
we don?t intend to pay money to see whether they are living up to their
expectations under the Agreed Framework.? Access to two disputed underground
sites that are reported to be nuclear development sites is a key point in the US
arguments. Latest reports do show that the United States has sent 300,000 tons
of grain to North Korea through the World Food Program. Hopes are that the
humanitarian aid will help inspire North Korea to cooperate. Decision Options
Towards North Korea The United States is presented with a difficult situation in
North Korea. The country falls deeper into depression and famine each day.
Undoubtedly, if funds were diverted from the military into agricultural
assistance, the situation would be eased. This is unlikely seeing that military
exports account for such a significant portion of foreign revenue. Therefore,
several options are presented to us: 1.) Increasing United States leadership
responsibilities and bolstering the military presence in the Pacific. Also,
cutting off all aid to N. Korea and letting them ?sweat it out?. U.S. public
support would be instrumental in this. 2.) The United States should utilize
constructive engagement to gain more influence. Tools for this would be KEDO and
humanitarian aid that could be directly sent and distributed by the United
States. 3.) Do nothing. By doing nothing we can let the North Korean government
destroy itself. Our involvement may be what is keeping the government in power.
4.) Military invasion of North Korea. Take control of their economy and let
Korea unite into one nation. These options are all viable, but perhaps not
realistic solutions to the North Korean problem. For instance, a military
invasion of North Korea, while some in the government may want it is not
acceptable. The Department of State would not support this option either seeing
their extensive efforts already in place. Domestic would generally be
unsupportive, and support in Congress appears almost obsolete. Public opinion
abroad might turn overwhelmingly anti-American and the United States would be
could be forced with a coalition of Asian states against it. Also this would not
back the United States? morally righteous opinion of itself. Therefore, we can
conclude that this option is neither achievable nor realistic. Option three,
doing nothing, is also a viable solution. Could it happen though? The United
States may already have too many interests and groundwork laid in North Korea to
simply take everything aback and cut off all support. Again, public opinion
comes into play. The media would exploit this decision as mean and cruel. That
in turn would put pressure on the ?public servants? who run the government.
They might be compelled to alter the decision. This would not be a very
humanitarian option and might conflict with the president?s seemingly more
idealistic foreign policy. The Department of Defense also would not be keen on
the idea seeing it would give the North Koreans an opportunity to mobilize its
resources, perhaps even develop nuclear weapons. Therefore, this is also not a
realistic option. Option two seems more realistic. It also seems to be the
current foreign policy being used on North Korea as dictated by the State
Department. The State Department has the task of overseeing the implementation
of the Agreed Framework of 1994. They can use KEDO and the Agreed Framework to
put pressure on the North Korean government to make concessions and reforms.
This would be a peaceful process that would only require time and cooperation
from most of the legislative and executive branches of the government. It would
also require adequate help from Japan and South Korea. China might be a wild
card to throw into this as well. They could help the North Koreans restructure
their system away from a command economy and provide leadership in relations
with the United States and the United Nations. Charles Kartman stated in his
address to the House International Relations Committee, ?Through engagement,
in 1994 we concluded with the DPRK the Agreed Framework to deal with the
DPRK?s nuclear program.? He also stated, ?Although it is a difficult task
we are convinced that we can achieve our objectives best by carefully engaging
the North Korean regime, not by isolating it.? This clearly shows the entire
State Departments views towards North Korea: constructive engagement. In
response to the missile test of August 31, 1998, we can observe that the United
States is responding to this point of view as if it were not really important in
the grand scheme of dealings with North Korea, although it should not be
repeated. Notice that no extremely harsh measures were imposed against North
Korea for this. Implementation of KEDO went along as planned. Kartman?s
statements above can illustrate that the basis of this decision is deeply rooted
in the Agreed Framework and the precedent that was started with it. The strength
of this argument lies in the fact that North Korea has not developed any nuclear
weapons (that we know of at this time) and that engagement resolved a crisis in
1994. The weaknesses of this argument are that it gives too much leeway to North
Korea in terms of what happened August 31. Was that actually a satellite launch
or was it a test for their new missile for potential buyers elsewhere? We still
do not know what is contained in the two underground sites that they hold and we
are still unsure of where all of the nuclear products have gone. This system is
based on a level of trust and the assumption that North Korea will play by the
rules. In a pre-production copy of a report to Congress, the Committee to Assess
the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States stated that development of the
Taepo-Dong 2 is currently taking place. Our knowledge of their ability to use
this weapon may be very short before the actual launching. This missile is
thought to have a long enough range to target most military bases in Alaska as
well as an area from Phoenix, Arizona to Madison, Wisconsin. This could be used
to target the United States and other countries with nuclear weapons that could
be developed away from the watchful eyes of the United States. The fourth option
of the United States would be to increase military pressure on the North Korean
government by taking a strong leadership role in the International Community.
Richard V. Allen, an analyst for the Heritage Foundation, wrote an essay on Ten
Steps to Address North Korea?s Nuclear Threat. The general scheme of the
document is the basis for this argument. The United States must be ready
militarily for a backlash from the North Korean government. The United States
should lead the allied coalition for a strong policy against North Korea. They
need to stop funding and technology transfers coming from other countries,
especially Japan, China and Russia. Koreans in Japan send as much as one billion
dollars a year in aid to North Korea. If this is cut off, we can effectively use
sanctions against North Korea. Korea uses much of this money to buy oil from
China, who supplies up to 75% of North Korea?s imported oil. China is also
suspected to be a principle supplier of technology information to North Korea.
The United States should also make sure to let it be known to China and Russia
that sanctions are sanctions and the United States expects them to be followed.
Non-compliance consequences could be set up to prompt a more pro-US trade
relation between those countries and North Korea. US forces should be deployed
to counter any North Korean attack on South Korea or its neighbors. If the North
Korean government collapses, it might lash out militarily as it goes, leaving
behind a war-zone in the wake of its destruction. The launch of the missile on
August 31 only goes to bolster this argument, the worse off the people become,
the better equipped the government becomes militarily and the more desperate
they become. Public support in the United States would be essential to the
implementation of this. That could determine partisan support in congress. That
support would be greatly needed to fully implement this. Only a total conviction
would be fully effective. It could not be half-asked. The pressure built on
North Korea would hopefully force it to comply with United States? demands and
maybe even collaborate with South Korea over some issues of migration and maybe
even unification. The weakness of this position is that it is so complex. The
end result can only be achieved by a full commitment. Past United States history
has shown that since Vietnam the country is very reluctant to go to war unless
we are sure to win (Persian Gulf), also the Nixon Doctrine may be used in
retaliation to U.S. increased military presence in Asia. Vietnam will be used as
an example and the media may turn the situation sour. This might also lead North
Korea to desperation in their anticipation of a U.S. attack. They could attack
South Korea, hoping to gain territory to be used for bargaining. Also the
volatile nature of the North Korean government lends another hand to this issue.
What will the North Korean?s reaction be when the United States withdraws from
the Agreed Framework 0f 1994? It is currently unpredictable. The Best Solution
Many factors must go into the United States? foreign policy decision about
North Korea. There are many long term and short term complications that one must
consider. Unification is an enormous factor. It is generally thought that there
is a sense of manifest destiny on the Korean peninsula. But Korean unification
could be costly and painful. Estimates are that the cost could amount to
something like $800 billion over ten years. This is based upon the assumption
that a German model will be used with heavy expenditures on social welfare and
environmental cleansing. That is a long-term implication of policy. Both options
one and two work to achieve this but through different ways. The best solution
in my opinion is option number one. I agree with the slightly more idealistic
option. It warrants a peaceful solution that would perhaps ease the North and
South into unification over a long, extended period of time. The increase of
troops in option two could serve to undermine security on the Korean Peninsula.
?Reducing an adversary?s security can reduce the state?s own security in a
way?by increasing the value the adversary places on expansion, thereby making
it harder to deter.? The United States? buildup of military on the Korean
Peninsula could serve to make the North Korean?s believe that we intend them
for offensive use. The first option also seems better to me because is has
proven successful in a number of ways so far. While the North Koreans are still
building missiles, they are not building nuclear warheads to arm them with. The
non-proliferation aspects of this option work. The IAEA is monitoring the
nuclear reactors there effectively. Although things are not quite what we
desire, cooperation is being used to benefit all. North Korea will greatly
benefit from the two new energy reactors and the world will benefit from them
not becoming a nuclear power. North Korea still will remain a threat to peace
and stability in northeast Asia. We can only attempt to deal with them as we did
with South Africa. Hopefully, the recent domestic problems will fuel dissent
among the North Koreans and perhaps there will be an overthrow of the government
(although unlikely at this time). Economically, it is more beneficial to aid
them. We appear to the world community to promote economic welfare and
humanitarian aid while we establish closer links to our partners in KEDO. North
Korea could ease into the unification process by working together with the South
to build the new power plants. The people working together might inspire a new
age to the Korean Peninsula and might push the people of North Korea to want
reform. The Four-Party Peace Talks might yield progress yet, although when will
progress come about is another question. This option is the long and tedious
process of negotiation, testing each other?s will and making concessions
towards progress. This seems to be the logical choice in light of public opinion
today and the growing anti-war trend in world politics. A change could be made
however in the nature of the aid that is being given to North Korea in the form
of food. Instead of going through International groups, the United States should
take the initiative to give and distribute the aid themselves. If United States
workers got contracts to ship and distribute the food aid, it might possibly
help the situation. It would do this by improving relations on the grass roots
level. It might help settle anti-United States feelings that are running high in
Korea. Stronger leadership is another pre-requisite for a change in the current
situation The United States must be resolute in its dealings with North Korea.
Without strong leadership, partisan politics could restrain the implementation
of KEDO and other vital resources to the Korean Peace Process. KEDO can not
survive without funding from the United States government. Congress must
appropriate the money as it sees fit. It will be the job of the leader to
convince Congress and the whole nation that this is the right option. Conclusion
The United States? dilemma towards North Korea was heightened by the August
31, 1998 launch of the new missile. The incident tightened an already tight
operation. The United States responded to it in two different manners.
Domestically, people including Congress wanted to cut funding seeing that the
process wasn?t going anywhere. Whereas the State Department and some choice
institutions believe that the process of constructive engagement is the best way
to achieve progress. Historically it seems that our ?quarantine? of North
Korea only led to a near disaster in 1994. The engagement worked here and
produced an agreement that still binds the four parties involved. While there
have been bumps in the road, it seems that things are progressing. Unfortunately
the famine and widespread poverty in North Korea dampens the situation and
requires food aid that would otherwise not be diverted there. This catastrophe
might even heighten the situation to the point where North Korea is willing to
negotiate in more favor of United States interests. This could come in exchange
for a clause to the Agreed Framework whereby food is included in drop-offs of
oil and parts for the reactors. This scenario is still tense, with each side
attempting to play out the situation to the best of their advantage. I do
believe that the best foreign policy option to pursue in light of the situation
is the current one; building ties through engagement. It might not produce the
desired result to all, but it will keep North Korea from nuclear power and it
will provide them with a basis to build?the power plants. The United States
future with North Korea may appear doubtful, but one should not lose hope. I
predict that the North Korean government will collapse or lose power in the next
twenty years. They will go out with a brief flash, and then havoc. The
reunification process will have already begun by then?made more possible by
joint North-South Korean workers working on the power plants. But just as Russia