After the Battle
After his defeat in this battle, Darius made a few attempts to reorganize and rearm his troops. He also sent a few nervous notes to his governors and generals in Bactria urging them to remain loyal. After Guagamela, though, Darius lost his nerve and never recovered it.
While Parmenio rounded the Persian luggage up with its animals and supplies, Alexander rode on, hoping to overtake Darius’ party. He rested an hour or two, and resumed the chase at midnight. When he reached Arbela at dawn he found Darius gone after they had gone some 75 miles during the night’s chase.
Alexander managed to figure out how Darius had managed to escape from Guagamela. He and his followers fled headlong into Arbela, not even bothering to break river bridges as they went. At Arbela they were joined by Bessus, a few survivors from the Royal Guard, the Bactrian cavalry, and 2,000 Greek mercenaries. Soon after midnight he set out, taking the eastern road through the Armenian mountains. They eventually hit Ecbatana from the north. They stopped here for a while.
After fleeing from the battle, Darius left behind his chariot, bow, and about 4,000 talents in coined money. This was a substantial amount of money, equal to about 7.5 million dollars today.
After Alexander’s victory, the entire Persian empire was split in two. The ruler’s authority was ripped to shreds. The people of the empire were no longer united behind the Persian cause. Because of this, Alexander could proclaim himself the king of the empire in place of Darius, and no one could stop him. From Arbela, Alexander went to Babylon, which was acquired because of his victory in the battle of Guagamela.
The Battle of Jhelum
Background on the Battle
The battle of Jhelum was one of the major battles in Alexander’s campaign in India and Bactria. It took place at the River Jhelum. It took place in 326 B.C. Alexander, as usual, led his troops. The Indians were led by Porus, the monarch in Paurava who’s domain stretched as far as beyond the Hydaspes River and a great military leader.
India, the site of this battle, was not well known about by foreigners in this time. All the foreigners were ignorant about it and had misconceptions. To the Greeks, the land across the Indus was a shallow peninsula, bound on the north by the Hindu Kush and on the east by a great world. There was a stream, which was actually the ocean, that ran at no great distance beyond the Sind Desert. They knew nothing about the India sub-continent. In general, Alexander stayed pretty ignorant about India. His entire strategy was based on false assumptions, and when enlightenment came it was to late. The Great Ganges Plain, about which Alexander made one of the most lethal assumptions of all, shattered Alexander’s dream more effectively than any army every would or could.
It was almost impossible to even estimate the size of Alexander’s army at the time of this battle. He had no more than 15,000 Macedonians in his army, of which 2,000 were cavalry. The total amount of cavalry has been estimated to be anywhere between 6,500 and 15,000. The total amount of infantry is even more uncertain, with estimates varying from 20,000 to 120,000. Intelligence reports gave more certain amounts of men for Porus’ army. They said that Porus had 3,000-4,000 cavalry, up to 50,000 infantry, 200 elephants, and 300 war chariots. They also expected reinforcements from Abisares in this battle.
Before the Battle
The passage to Jhelum was very rough. Most of the walled towns attacked by Alexander gave violent resistance. For retaliation, when the cities fell Alexander butchered the inhabitants wholesale. One example of this slaughter was at Masaga. Here he massacred 7,000 Indian mercenaries along with their wives and children.
In March 325 B.C., Alexander gave his troops one month to rest. He ended this break with athletic contests. Then Alexander gave sacrifices, crossed the Indus, and went toward Taxila. Alexander, jumpy after his campaign, thought there was a dangerous plot in Taxila.
On his way to Taxila, he passed through Clitorial. Here he ordered his patrols to interrogate the natives and get information about elephants, of which Alexander had none. Most of the elephants, he found out, had fled across the river. Alexander rounded up 13 abandoned elephants and attached them to the column. He built a raft and they all went downstream.
When Alexander was near Taxila the rajah’s army was five miles away. Alexander, with only a small cavalry, went to Taxila. The rajah there guessed Alexander’s cause and surrendered. Alexander became Taxila’s new rajah for a while until he found a suitable person to govern it.
In Taxila Alexander and his army spent two or three months resting. This was a fatal mistake for Alexander because when they resumed their march it was June, the beginning of the monsoon season. During the monsoons, Alexander wanted to negotiate accommodations with Porus and Abisares, the rajahs of Kashmir. Once the ambassadors from Abisares returned Alexander sent his own envoy to Porus. By doing this, Alexander lost no time.
The Macedonians then went over the Kushan Pass to Alexandria-of-the- Caucasus in ten days. While he was still in Bactria, Alexander was joined by an Indian rajah, Sasigupta, who warned Alexander about dangers in the Khyber pass. After hearing about this, Alexander sent envoys to see Alexander’s Persian rajah at Taxila, the Indian Ambhi, and some Indians west of the Indus river. He asked them to meet with him, at their convenience, in the Kabul Valley.
Finally Ambhi and other Indian princes arrived bearing gifts of welcome and 25 elephants. Alexander’s eyes caught the elephants, and eventually Ambhi made a gift of them. Ambhi had good reason to side with the Macedonians. The reason was that Ambhi wanted the Macedonian army’s support in defeating his arch-enemy, Porus, who you might remember ruled past the Hydaspes River.
Some days after the meeting, Porus requested to see Alexander at the River Jhelum and to pay tribute in a token of vesselage. Alexander knew Porus would go there with a full military force, ready to use it.
Alexander, at the River Jhelum, desperately needed a transport flotilla. Unfortunately, it would take to long to build the ships and Taxila was miles from the nearest navigable river. Because of this problem, Alexander sent Coenus back to Inudes with orders to dismantle Alexander’s pontoon bridge, cut up boats, and load them onto carts. Then they would be carried over land for reassembling at the Jhelum.
About at the beginning of June in 336 B.C. a monsoon broke and a few days later Alexander lead his army southward to meet Porus through streaming, torrential rains that continued for two months. He got to the place he was to meet Porus at by going through Chakaval and Ava, both in the Salt Range, went through the Madana Pass, turned south-west and reached Jhelum Haranpur, having marched 110 miles since Taxila. He went to Haranpur because he knew it was one of the few places he could ford.
But when he reached Haranpur he found the opposite bank held by a large force with archers, chariots, and 85 elephants. The elephants kept guard, stamping and trumpeting to and fro. The river itself was swollen by the monsoons, a good one-third of a mile wide. It would not be an easy crossing.
At Jhelum, with the two opposing forces at opposite sides of the river bank, it looked like a stalemate. Alexander encouraged this impression by having endless wagon loads of corn and other stuff brought to his camp in full site of Porus and his army. The reason for this was to convince Porus that the Macedonians would wait until the river was fordable. At the same time Macedonian troop activities continued, to signal the possibility of an immediate attack. But as time passed, Porus became less and less distracted by the possibility of an attack by Alexander. This was just what Alexander wanted.
When Porus was paying little attention, the Macedonian cavalry was discreetly exploring higher reaches of the Jhelum and going as far as to the city of Jalapur. Here they found just what Alexander wanted:A large wooded island, now called Admana, with only a narrow channel going between it and the sides of it. It also had a nullah, or a deep gully, where Alexander’s army could hide.
Alexander decided to ford the Jhelum by night. He spent most of his time and ingenuity trying to confuse Porus. Every night fires were lit, with lots of noise and bustle. Porus took these seriously at first, but soon they were looked upon with disregard.
For his assault at Jhelum, Alexander planned to have a larger part of his army stay at the base camps near the place in Haranpur where he was planning to ford. The king’s pavilion would be pitched in a conspicuous position near the bank of the Jhelum. A certain officer would wear Alexander’s cloak in order to, to quote Alexander,”give an impression that the King himself was encamped on that part of the bank”.
But Alexander would really already be on his way to Jalapur. His force in Taxila, numbering 5,000 horse and at least 10,000 foot, would cross the river before dawn and advance to the southern bank on Porus’ position.
Alexander had divided his army into two groups. Hephadestion, Demetrius, and Perdiccas, with more than half of the cavalry and three battalions of the phalanx, were to go down the Khyber to the Indus. They were ordered to take over all the places in their way be force or agreement. This group would also make the conditions right for crossing once they were at the Indus.
The second group consisted of three battalions of phalanx and some mercenary cavalry and infantry. It was to have the position between Haranpur and the Admana Island opposite the main ford, and only would cross when the Porus had attacked Alexander’s army, and only then if no elephants were left behind. If he did not cross then, he could wait until he was sure that Porus was in retreat and Alexander victorious. Alexander would lead this group, and Cratereus would be second in command.
While the first group was doing what it was supposed to do, the second group planned to take a mobile column up the Chouskes River, to march through the hill country of Bajur and swat to reduce any enemy stronghold en route. It would also give cover to the left flank. The two forces would rendezvous and the Indus.
What Happened in the Battle
In this battle, Alexander made sure that whichever way he moved, Porus would be open for attack from the rear from either Alexander or Cratereus. His only possible defense would be to detach a strong but limited force that could destroy Alexander’s assault group before it established a bridgehead. This would leave Porus in charge of Haranpur, making it nearly impossible for the Macedonians to ford there.
Alexander built up a turning force from the units of the Royal Squadron of the Companions and the cavalry divisions under Hephestion, Perdiccas, and Demetrius, the Guards Brigade, two phalanx battalions, who were commanded by Coenus and Cletus the White, archers, cavalry from Bactria and Turkestan, and a special force of Scythan horse archers. This force was 15,000-16,000 strong.
Alexander brought this turning force to the crossing point and went on the boats and rafts by about 3:00 a.m. on the assault morning. When dawn broke and the wind and rain was less violent, the turning force’s flotilla was already sailing down the northern channel, still hidden by the woods of Admana. But when they passed beyond the western tip of Admana, Porus’ scouts saw them and sounded the alarm. Messengers rode away at full speed to tell Porus.
When the messenger was away, Alexander came into shore and disembarked all of his forces, with his cavalry leading, and got clear of Admana. But then he realized that what he’d thought to be a river bank was really another long, narrow island. Alexander finally managed to find a fording spot, but it took several hours, and by then Porus knew all about it.
When Alexander finally got ashore Porus detached a force of 2,000 cavalry and 120 chariots, under the command of his own son, with orders to ride east with all possible speed and, if possible, to destroy the assault group before it was clear of the river. This attempt failed because it was too late. Porus was heavily outnumbered, and his son was no match for Alexander. After a brief skirmish, the Indians fled. They suffered 400 casualties, including Porus’ son.
Finally, after the skirmish, Alexander’s army engaged in a real battle with Porus. Porus sent the rest of his army, consisting of about 20,000 infantry, 2,000 horse cavalry, 130 elephant cavalry, and 180 chariots. For this battle, Porus chose a level, sandy plain, with no mud, where elephants and cavalry would have plenty of room.
Porus drew up his i
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