Recent improvements in the privatization process, especially in dwellings, hold great promise for the
expansion of small-scale property ownership; an important step in consolidating private ownership. This
is along with a growing entrepreneurial spirit among less advantaged segments of the population,
especially the young (Fish 234).
To allow a government to actively encourage private, economic enterprise, political appointments must
move above the personal level. There must be a balance between the administrative and political roles of
the members of the bureaucracy. Shevstova writes on page 69 that Yeltsin ?has a habit of ranking
personal loyalty to himself far above professionalism when choosing appointees and subordinates.? The
clientelism of the Soviet era is alive and kicking in the Yeltsin government. To challenge this system, a
professional bureaucracy, one that is limited in its ability to intervene directly in the policy-making
process, must develop.
Another important component of democratization that Shevstova feels is missing from the current Yeltsin
administration is a lack of imperatives to build broad consensus and foster genuine communication
between leaders and citizens at large (Shevstova 57). Much of this can be attributed to the Communist
tradition that placed enormous authority in the local ministers. The autarkic, socialist system allowed
executive agencies to acquire many legislative functions. Communication with constituents and
consensus building was a unnecessary hassle. The real conflict existed within the decision-making elite.
As we will see later, elite conflict is still a major ingredient in the Yeltsin formula of power consolidation.
Shevstova call this lack of consensus building and communication a hangover from Leninism (Shevstova
57). Political power was restricted to a self-selected elite which iniated new personnel less for their
technical skills than their willingness to embrace Communist ideology or their relationship to powerful
party elites. This system of clientelism retarded and made irrelevant any development of modern,
responsive bureaucratic institutional arrangements. Consequently, today?s bureaucrats (and yesterday?s
communists) find it difficult to appreciate the need for compromise, power sharing, and local initiative.
This is precisely the problem Russia faces with Yeltsin. It is painfully apparent from his tenure as the
architect of Russia early transition period, that old habits die hard.
Yeltsin: Presidential Power and His Communist Tradition
A brief look at the Boris Yeltsin biographical sketch shows that he is truly a maverick who, on the eve of
Ol? Blue Eyes birthday (Sinatra that is; I think Yeltsin also has blue eyes), ?did it his way.? Rising
through the nomenklatura , gaining a reputation as a fearless reformer, Yeltsin found himself as a
member of the Politburo. Once again, Yeltsin proved an able and determined reformer, but an
estrangement between himself and Gorbachev set in when Yeltsin began criticizing the slow pace of
reform at party meetings, challenging party conservatives and even criticizing Gorbachev himself. Yeltsin
was forced to resign in disgrace from the Moscow party leadership in 1987 and from the Politburo in
1988. His Lazarus act is well documented. Just as well documented his tendency to become a political
chameleon, changing his colors to suit any political condition. He has been a communist boss, a reformer
within the communist system, a liberal slayer of communism and a nationalist warrior against
secessionism (Shevstova 69). While the American president may wear many hats, Yeltsin has traded in
his entire wardrobe numerous times over. He is truly a skilled political in-fighter, maneuvers he learned
from his Communist political education.
Lilia Shevstova is ardently critical of the decisions Yeltsin has made in the post-Soviet era. She lays
much of the responsibility for the politics of confrontation squarely at the feet of Yeltsin and his advisors
(Shevstova 58).
First, she debunks the idea that Yeltsin is a ?destroyer of the old system. Correctly, she considers him a
reformer who has not attempted to address the institutional hegemony held by the former nomenklatura .
His policies have resulted in the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of the former
communist elites. And she lists a number of Soviet era tactics, such as playing the members of
nomenklatura against one another, that still personify Yeltsin decision making (Shevstova 60). Yeltsin
still digs deep into his Communist bag of tricks when trying to consolidate his power.
The Presidential Revolution of 1993 signified a turn towards a more personalistic brand of rule for Russia.
Shevstova argues, and I would agree, that the Constitutional Crisis of 1993 was largely predicated on
Yeltsin attempting to outmaneuver his old Communist rivals, who had taken refuge in the legislature
(Shevstova 62). The supporters that Yeltsin lined up behind him for this insurgency upon the Supreme
Soviet were wildly divergent in their political orientations and goals. They included liberal reformers,
bureaucrats and pragmatists, statists and security officials, and extreme nationalists (Shevstova 63). This
motley crew testifies to the bizarre landscape that makes up Russian politics.
Yet it is that bizarre political landscape that Yeltsin appears to be most comfortable operating upon.
Yeltsin can consolidate and maintain authority because of the lingering sense of crisis that hangs over
Russian politics (Shevstova 65). The widely held belief that a successor would be a worse option and an
absence of any real alternatives has allowed Yeltsin to maneuver with impunity. The June presidential
elections present a clear example of this phenomenon. Even with horrendous economic and political
performance, Yeltsin still was able to defeat Zhyguanov, for the reason that the challenger was the pits, a
tired political retread. Shevstova refers to ?the fear, inertia, and disorientation that pervade Russia?
(Shevstova 65). Yeltsin has adeptly used these pathologies to create a system that Shevstova refers to as
?divide and conquer? (Shevstova 69).
So what are the dangers in Yeltsin?s brand of governing? There has been very little change in how things
are done under the Yeltsin regime versus the Gorbachev regime. The specific issues were addressed in the
previous section. Another important point to note is that there has been too much reliance on Yeltsin?s
personal prestige and charisma (Shevstova 64). Yeltsin operates outside of the nascent party system
because parties constrain leaders. He is not an institution builder but, as his policies have demonstrated,
he is a populist. His communist background has not made him adverse to resorting to extra-legal means
to achieving his goals. It is this procedural uncertainty, and reliance upon the ?man? and not the
?measures?, that create the greatest concern for the establishment of stable democracy.
The Crystal Ball
The problems that I have outlined in this paper do not bode well for the establishment of a stable
democracy in Russia for the near future. The literature on the subject contends that consolidated
democracy is not a likely option for Russia. Instead we are much more likely to see a ?unconsolidated?
democracy take hold in Russia.
Fish describes an unconsolidated democracy as a system that would include many of the basic elements of
democracy, such as elections and considerable civil and cultural freedoms (Fish 226). Yet we are unlikely
to see the establishment of durable and stable rules and institutions that are appropriate to their respective
social structures or accepted by their respective citizenries (Smitter 60). Because of the lack of any
credible alternatives to democracy, we are unlikely to see a regression back to authoritarianism. Yet if
appropriate reforms are not enacted, we are likely to see what is referred to as democracy by default
(Smitter 60). The basic rights of democracy will exist but ?regular, acceptable, and predictable
democratic patterns never quite crystallize? (Smitter 61). The 1993 Constitution excaberates this problem
by placing enormous power in the hands of the president, laying the groundwork for discretionary,
personal expressions of authority that contradict the needed objectives of broad based political
aggregation.
There has been growing disenchantment in Russia with the not only Yeltsin, the politician, but with the
institution of democracy itself. Public opinion show that most Russians evaluate democracy in negative
terms (Whitefield). This is the danger of having a politician also represent a movement. For a stable
democracy to take hold in Russia, Yeltsin and future presidents must not become institutions themselves.
The personalization of transition politics presents enormous difficulties by hampering the
institutionalization of necessary reforms.
Still, with all these problems that have been outlined, I feel that it is unlikely that we will see a return to
authoritarianism. Lilia Shevtsova concludes:
?Despite the shallowness of democracy?s roots and the continuous attempts by some in power to curtail
freedom, the obstacles to the establishment of a full blow authoritarian regime appear insurmountable.
There are just too many active and self-conscious interest groups, too many people who have become
accustomed to life in a relatively free atmosphere, too many competing elites, no united and effective
bureaucracy, and a military establishment that seems highly unlikely to rally behind any would be man on
horseback? (Shevtsova 70).
The character of the next regime will provide many clues to what the future of Russia might be.
Economic transformations are not sufficient conditions for the consolidation of democracy. I am not
optimistic that Yeltsin has either the proclivity or the longevity to engage in any sort of meaningful
political reform. If the next regime does not adequately address what, Smitter referred to as, the extrinsic
dilemmas facing Russia, then consolidation is very unlikely. These dilemmas include political graft,
privileged treatment of the elite, unequal distribution of wealth, and crime (Smitter 73). If they are not
dealt with the future of democracy will be bleak, indeed.
Works Cited
Drobizheva , Leokadia. “Democratization and Nationalism in the Russian Federation.” Sponsored by the
Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies: Presented on February 8 1996.
Fish, Stephen. Democracy From Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution .
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
Jowitt, Kenneth. ?Dizzy With Democracy.? Problems of Post Communism, 1 (Jan-Feb, 1996) :
3-8.
Lapidus, Gail and Edward Walker. ?Nationalism, Regionalism, and Federalism: Center
Periphery Relations in Post Communist Russia.? In Lapidus, ed., The New Russia. (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1995): 79-113.
Shevtsova, Lilia. ?The Two Sides of The New Russia.? Journal of Democracy. 6 (July 1995): 41-55.
Smitter, Phillipe C. ?Dangers And Dilemmas Of Democracy.? Journal of Democracy,
5 (April 1994): 57-74.
Whitefield, Stephen and Geoffrey Evans. ?The Popular Basis of Anti-Reform Politics on Russia.?
Drobizheva , Leokadia. “Democratization and Nationalism in the Russian Federation.” Sponsored by the
Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies: Presented on February 8 1996.
Fish, Stephen. Democracy From Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution .
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
Jowitt, Kenneth. ?Dizzy With Democracy.? Problems of Post Communism, 1 (Jan-Feb, 1996) :
3-8.
Lapidus, Gail and Edward Walker. ?Nationalism, Regionalism, and Federalism: Center
Periphery Relations in Post Communist Russia.? In Lapidus, ed., The New Russia. (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1995): 79-113.
Shevtsova, Lilia. ?The Two Sides of The New Russia.? Journal of Democracy. 6 (July 1995): 41-55.
Smitter, Phillipe C. ?Dangers And Dilemmas Of Democracy.? Journal of Democracy,
5 (April 1994): 57-74.
Whitefield, Stephen and Geoffrey Evans. ?The Popular Basis of Anti-Reform Politics on Russia.?