system from one era to the next.
the US-Japan-China triangle
An analysis of the US-Japan-China, an old triangle with new content
illustrates many features of the transition from the Cold War to the post Cold
War system of international relations. During the Cold War “both Tokyo and
Washington developed their China policies in part to thwart Moscow’s designs
towards China and Asia.” The US and China no longer act together to balance
Soviet power; the US-Japan alliance no longer serves as a weight against
balancing the power of both China and the Soviet Union; and Japan and China do
not architect their relationship in light of US policies. The US-Japan-China
triangle in the post cold war era rather illustrates all three nations’ concern
with economic prosperity and trade: American policy of placing trade at the
center of US-Japan relations; China’s emphasis on economic modernization
constituting the cornerstone of its foreign policy; Japan’s policy of ?expanding
equilibrium.’ Today’s US-Japan-China triangle also reveals Japan’s increasingly
independent stance from the US, the US’s stress on democracy and human rights,
the reversal of the roles of China and the US, greater China-Japan bilateralism.
The game of power – the attempts at gaining military , and more importantly
economic leverage for oneself and controlling that of the other powers- is still
evident, despite the dissolution of a ?universal’ threat. But it is only who’s
playing against who that has changed. So the concept of strategic geometry is
still valid and applicable. “Potential competition and mutual distrust between
China and Japan were it to grow into something large would replace the post war
contest between the US and the Soviet Union as dominant feature of international
politics in Asia.” During the Cold War, US military presence in Asia served as a
deterrence against the military power of the Soviet Union; in the post Cold War
era, it is a form of reassurance against the rise of Chinese military power.
Relations with Japan is the most important bilateral relation Beijing
has, after that with Washington. “PRC leaders see an intimate connection between
their policies towards Washington and Tokyo. From Beijing’s perspective there is
a ?strategic triangle’ in Asia (US, Japan and China) and it is Beijing’s purpose
to utilize that three way relationship to its advantage.” Beijing seeks to use
the prospect of improved political and economic ties with Japan to induce
Washington to be more politically cooperative, relax sanctions and encourage
more American investment. On the other hand, “Japan is the principal economic
and security challenge looming in China’s future.” Despite greater bilateralism
between Japan and China based on the economic stakes and increasing volume of
trade, China still harbors a fear of Japanese economic domination and a deep
distrust in general. America’s capital, willingness to transfer technology and
ability to restrain Japan all serve China’s interests. The disappearance of the
Soviet threat has undermined the stability of the US-Japanese partnership,
hence the distance between Japan and US has meant that China has become all the
more important to Washington. A closer security relationship between US and
China would further diminish the strategic importance of Japan to the US. At the
same time “China looms all the more important for Japan as US interest, presence
and influence in Asia seem to diminish.” This means America’s differences with
China over human rights issues could also drive a wedge between US-Japan
relations, since Japan would not join the US in imposing trade sanctions on
China, owing to its own bilateral stakes. However, “in the long run Japan’s
ability to counter the geopolitical challenge from China depends on maintaining
a robust alliance with the US.” Furthermore, in the post Cold War era, the
island of Taiwan is reshaping politics of the Quadrangle, adding another
dimension to the US-Japan-China triangle, since the US’s ideological
proclivities towards Taiwan are in opposition to Japan’s economic
proclivities towards the mainland. According to Peter Hayes, North East Asia is
overlaid by twin informal strategic triangles: the US “has linked China and
Japan in an informal security triangle, and the common hypotenuse between this
great power triangle on the one hand, and the informal security triangle among
South Korea, US and Japan on the other.”
Korea
Another major strategic change involves the economic rise of South Korea
and isolation of the North. The rise of North and South Korea as major players
in the Asian political arena is emblematic of the transition from the Cold War
to the post Cold War system of international relations in the region. “Korea was
important to the US only as a strategic tripwire for its Japan centered extended
deterrence in the region.” Korea was symbolic of America’s cold war resolve to
draw the containment line in East Asia. Political alignment in the region vis-a-
vis both Koreas is demonstrative of differences between Cold War and post Cold
War. The evolution of triangles involving the two Koreas highlight the
decreasing role of ideology, socialist confrere and geopolitical rivalry, and
the increasing importance of stability, world order, regional peace
and economic prosperity. During the Cold War there existed two basic triangles
involving Korea: one comprising the US, Japan, South Korea and the other
comprising North Korea, Soviet Union, China. Since 196 5 the US-Japan-South
Korea triangle, as Kent Calder argues emerged as another key feature of the
highly dynamic but unbalanced economic and security relations of the region. In
1993, the scenario was entirely different with the US-Japan-South Korea-China-
Russia all against North Korea, owing to its forward nuclear policy.
The “rapid progress in Moscow-Seoul relations, coupled with an equally
rapid decompression of Moscow-Pyongyang relations, has taken the sting out of
the long festering ideological and geopolitical rivalry China, and the former
Soviet Union engaged in over North Korea. The ending of Cold War bipolarity has
meant the demise of not only the vaunted China card in the collapsed strategic
triangle (North Korea-China -Soviet Union) but also the Pyongyang card in the
old Sino-Soviet rivalry.” The rapprochement between China and South Korea in
1992, as a means to establish regional peace, hinted a possible emergence of a
triangular relationship with the PRC in the best position to influence the two
Koreas. The increasing economic interaction between China and South Korea, a
major inspiration and product of the rapprochement is coupled with North Korea’s
attempts at gradually adopting the South Korea model of economic development
transmitted through China. Through this triangle we see the emphasis on
political stability and economic prosperity, quite different to the post Cold
War concerns involving Korea and China. The rapprochement between North and
South Korea has also forced Japan to build her ties with the former. From
Japan’s point of view this is necessary for the building of a ?new international
order,’ while from North Korea’s perspective this represents an opening for
economic assistance from Japan. Everyone now wants a piece of the pie, even
North Korea!
Moreover, during the Cold War, the US consistently supported and
enhanced South Korea in its rivalry with North Korea. With the demise of the
Soviet Union, the US endorsed South Korea’s ambitious northern diplomacy
(Nordpolitik) that was primarily designed to normalize its relations with the
Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe, but was also intended to ease its frozen
confrontation with North Korea. During the Cold War the US regarded its military
position in the Korean peninsula as a pivotal buffer to protect Japan’s security
interests and to counterbalance strategic ascendancy of the Soviet Union and
China. According to Curtis, today “US troops serve as a buffer between the two
Koreas, as a check against Japan’s military expansion and as a message to China
and Russia that the US will remain a Pacific power. It is the most visible
evidence of the US resolve to protect US economic interests.” Hence, the
politics of the Korean peninsula, which have become so integral to the system
of international relations in Asia can be seen in terms of a whole set of
triangular interactions.
Russia
Another way in which strategic geometry is a useful concept for
understanding the transition from a Cold War to a post Cold War system is
through the disappearance and obsoleteness of some of the old triangles. Russia
is such as case in point.
The collapse of the Soviet Union has radically altered the face of
international politics in East Asia, beginning with Gorbachev who revised three
central features of post war Soviet policy in Asia by: 1. freeing it from the
albatross of Sino-Soviet conflict 2. by suppressing the dominating idea of an
East-West contest, shifted Soviet policy towards Japan. 3.by ending the Sino-
Soviet conflict meant that China was no longer the motivation for Moscow’s
preoccupation with quantity and quality of arms, and hence did away with the
significance of the Sino-Soviet-US triangle. “By altering Soviet priorities and
by changing with whom and for what reason the Soviet Union would compete,
Gorbachev brought an end to the pernicious geometry of the previous three
decades. Triangles, by definition, are inherently tension filled; they are
tripolarity with built in antagonism. Until, Gorbachev the quadrangle was in
fact, two- perhaps-three-triangles. He terminated two triangles in which Soviet
Union had a part.”
In the post Cold War era, “Russia’s relevance is not likely to be a
factor affecting the basic equilibrium in East Asia.” According to Mandlebaum,
Russia and her new neighbors have become of marginal importance to the central
concerns of the other three powers. The fall of communism and Russia’s less
intrusive role in Asia has meant that many of the old interactions and old
triangles have ceased to be relevant. This power who to the greatest extent,
viewed the politics of Asia in terms of strategic geometry, today, has a
diminished presence, if virtually a non-existent one in the regions major
strategic geometry. Asia to the Russians has become Central Asia. “The Soviet
Union’s security agenda whose focus divided entirely between China and US-
Japanese connection, while not wholly abandoned has for the new Russia shifted
dramatically towards Central Asia.” Subsequently this has meant China’s
increased importance among East Asian states for Russia. Currently, Russia’s
most important ally in Asia is Kazakhstan, having taken on the role of
Kazakhstan’s nuclear protector (not unlike the US with Japan), but Russia also
cares about internal developments within Kazakhstan and the evolution of its
foreign relations, particularly with China. There maybe prospects here for a
lesser regional triangle between Russia-China-Kazakhstan.
A study of the strategic geometry involving Russia today sheds light on
many aspects of the shift from a Cold War to a post Cold War system. According
to Mandlebaum, “the collapse of the Soviet Union has already given rise to a
debate on the possibilities of a new strategic triangle involving the US, Japan
and Russia.” Russia’s role in today’s Sino-Japanese-Russian triangle is in
balancing the power of both China and Japan. Russia and Japan have reversed
roles in the post Cold War–Japan is now the major league player and Russia is
the secondary player, buffeted by the happenings in Sino-Japanese relations.
“Should the Sino-Japanese-Russian triangle revive, it will be much more dramatic
than the late 19th century and Cold war versions,” posits Mandlebaum. The new
basis for Japan-China-Russia triangle is also to maintain a more congenial
regional environment. The emphasis has shifted to stability and peace.
Today Sino-Russian bilateral relations are based on a ?constructive
partnership’ for accelerated economic cooperation including Russian arms sales
to China and an overt ?meeting of the minds’ on Central Asia. Tensions will
again rise, especially since Sino-Russian competition for influence in the
buffer states of inner Asia that are now emerging will be permanent. According
to Mandlebaum, “we have not seen the end of their rivalry.” On the other hand,
is the view that neither country has much the other needs, with both looking
towards Japan and America for capital. Economics is the name of the game in East
Asia, and Russia looks like a minor league player to Chinese, coupled with a
deep level of cultural suspicion.
On the other hand, the most crucial of the Cold War triangles, the
Russia-US-China triangle seems to hold relatively little significance. However,
two political games of today, might still substantiate the existence of this
triangle 1.the crux of Chinese analysis– that there is an inherent conflict
between Moscow and Washington, on matters of aid and weapons build down which
will provide openings for its own diplomacy 2. the weapons issue– “the US fears
China’s success in skimming cream of weapons experts from Russia.” The latter is
a very Cold War type of concern: the issue of military strength, which continues
to interlock the three major military powers.
In reference to the US-Japan-Russia triangle, the Japan-Russia part of
the triangle still remains quite undeveloped.