A War Of Independence Essay, Research Paper
When a suppressed nation decides to take up action in order to achieve its freedom, many issues
are raised, for, such actions do not affect only the conquered and the conquerors but they have an
enormous impact on all neighbor nations. Therefore, the Greek war of independence is a
multidimensional event which did not have to do only with the two peoples directly involved
(Turkish and Greek) but with the rest of the European countries as well. For this reason the
Greek war of Independence has to be examined within the broader context of the relations of the
European states, their economic and imperialistic interests and plans, their recent experience of
wars and how all these factors are interwoven.
After the defeat of Napoleon, European states decided that they had somehow to preserve a
balance in Europe so as to avoid any future offensive advances of any country. For this reason,
the most powerful countries of Europe (Great Britain, Austria, Russia, France and Prussia)
gathered in Paris in 1815, in an effort to secure a lasting peace in the Continent. Actually their
main purpose was to contain the so far offensive policy of France. As a matter of fact we can
verify this from a state speech that Lord Castlereagh, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs,
gave at the Cabinet in 1820: “It was a union for the Reconquest and liberation of great
proportion of the Continent of Europe from the Military D minion of France. [...]. It was never
intended as a union for the Government of the World, or for the Superintendence of the Internal
Affairs of other States” (quoted in J. Joll, 71). However, at the back-stages of all these official
conferences many secret agreements were being concluded among the allies, the one trying to
steal away power from the other.
That is how the European picture, more or less, looked like when the Greek struggle for
independence broke out in 1821 –in the beginning rather unsuccessfully– in the Danubian
Principalities under the leadership of Alexander Ipsilantis. In fact, during that time the Great
Powers were at the Conference of Laibach with an agenda full of insurrections in Spain and
Italy. Consequently, the news concerning Greece were the last thing the Great Powers wanted to
hear. Especially Metternich, the Austrian chancellor, was altogether appalled by the news and
he tried to influence the Tsar against the Greeks. According to Gaston Isambert, in order to
apprehend Metternich’s foreign policy “we have to penetrate deep to +. de Metternich’s
character”. Isambert also claims that Metternich was viewing the sultan as a means to make the
subjugation of nations a legitimate action. Furthermore, Metternich was very much afraid that the
Russians, under the pretext of protecting the Greek Christians, might interfere in the internal
affairs of the Ottoman Empire (Isambert, 65-66) and thus find a way out to the Mediterranean
Sea.
As far as how the British viewed the Greek uprising, Finley says: “The British Cabinet was
more surprised by the Greek Revolution, and viewed the outbreak with more aversion than any
other Christian government [...]. The immediate suppression of the revolt seemed therefore to be
the only way of preventing Greece from falling under the protection of Emperor Alexander, and
of hindering Russia from acquiring naval stations in the Mediterranean.” (Finley, 2). At that time
Castleragh was the head of the Foreign Office and it seems that more or less he was sharing the
same anxieties with Metternich. However, in letter that Castlereagh sent to Bagot, the British
ambassador in Russia, on 28 October 28 1822, he does not seem to be quite sure of how the
Greek question should be handled: “Ought the Turkish yoke to be forever riveted upon the necks
of their suffering and Christians subjects?” (quoted in Joll, 83 ). In this statement we discern
some sympathy, and maybe even a willingness to help the Greeks but reading the same letter
further down we can understand why the policy of Gastlereagh and generally of England had
been rather inconsistent, especially during the first years of the Greek revolt. Castlereagh feared
that, even if the Turks could be removed from the Greek territories, the Greeks would not be
capable of forming a government without the influence of a foreign power and the power he was
referring to was Russia. Castlereagh concludes his letter by saying that he could not put into
danger “the frame of long established relations, and to aid the insurrectionary efforts now in
progress in Greece” (quoted in Joll, 84). Accordingly, one can argue that, as far as the eastern
Mediterranean issue was concerned, what had brought together Castlereagh and Canning was
their common wish to maintain the peace in the East and that this can be considered as the
quintessence of the British and Austrian policy of that period.
Alexander I of Russia
At this point it is worthwhile mentioning Castlereagh’s reference to Russia as the possible
power influencing the Greeks. As a matter of fact, at that time, everybody thought that Russia
was supporting the Greeks. Russia, more than any other European state, had obvious reasons for
longing a Greek revolution against her “eternal” enemy, Turkey, because if the Ottoman Empire
collapsed, the Russians would have access to the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, Russia was
in the eyes of the other states as a probable sponsor of the revolution since both nations
belonged to the Orthodox faith. Additionally, the belief that the Tsar was behind the Revolution
of Greece became even more intense by the Greeks themselves. In fact, Greeks had the false – as
it turned out to be later on – impression that Russia would come to their rescue. This impression
was justified by the fact that Tsar Alexander had vaguely given some faint hopes to the
revolutionaries before the revolution. (Finley, 1). However, the Tsar and his ministers were in a
dilemma. On the one hand, the Greeks, being in friction with the Turks, were affecting
tremendously the commercial activities of Russia. This was because during the years before
1821, Russia started exporting grain to the Western European countries using mainly Greek
vessels that carried the Turkish flag. However, since Greeks were in conflict with the Ottoman
Empire, the former were not allowed any more to pass through the Straits and consequently the
exporting power of Russia was curtailed. (Anderson, 60). On the other hand, it goes without
saying that the Tsar did not wish any alteration of the existent status quo in Europe. Monarchies
should be preserved, and therefore, Tsar Alexander’s objective would, naturally, be to preserve
his monarchical rule.
In Laibach the Powers were taken aback. Metternich and Castlereagh on the one side were
against any Russo-Turkish conflicts, let alone war, and on the other side there was Russia facing
a two-blade knife. Both Castlereagh and Metternich put all their efforts on influencing the Tsar
against the Greeks. That is how the Tsar decided to keep a rather neutral stance.
Caslereagh
Though the Greek Revolution took place in 1821, it was not officially discussed before the
Conference of Verona (October-November 1822). However, during the period between the two
conferences the Great Powers were feverishly trying to influence one another on their conduct
regarding the Greek issue. This atmosphere is successfully described by Finley who says that
Europe was threatened by a “war of opinion”. (Finley, 3).
This is how the diplomatic arena had shaped when the Great Powers met at the Conference of
Verona in 1822. Castlereagh died before the Conference took place and was succeeded by
George Canning. + mentioned this takeover of the Foreign Office by G. Canning since historians
identify him as the main cause for the shift of the British policy towards the Greek cause and for
the reevaluation of the relations of England with the other European Powers. However,
Castlereagh had started differentiating his position from the alliance some months before he
died; the reason was not disagreements concerning Greece but the insistence of Alexander + on
applying to Spain the principles of the Protocol of Troppau, something that Gastlereagh did not
want. (Bridge & Bullen, 40). It is also clear that “Alexander, unlike Gastlereagh, had evolved
no clear strategy with which to pursue Russian aims in the postwar world.” (Bridge & +ullen,
28). Actually, it appears that “Lord Gastlereagh as the representative of this country, demurred
to pledge which his sovereign could not undertake independently of Parliament”, showing how
Castlereagh felt to the proposal of Alexander to come to the “assistance in case of domestic as
well as of international difficulty.” (L. Courtrney, 372).
Canning, did not attend the conference of Verona but he sent the Duke of Wellington, who was
given instructions to maintain strict, neutral stance (D. Dakin, 148-149). Furthermore,
“Wellington had been instructed, if necessary, to break the unity of the Congress.” (Temperley,
66). However, what was mainly to be discussed at this Congress was the Spanish question,
which in turn could have helped the Greeks. The Spanish question had always been the apple of
discord between the Great Powers, and had the revolution of Spain divided the Powers into
different groups, the Greeks could have taken advantage of this. The strong European states,
though, were flexible enough to form the appropriate groups and agreements according to the
subject in question. (Isambert, 142). Surprisingly but logically enough the Great Powers had not
included in the Conference of Verona the Greek Revolution. Had they done so they would have
officially accepted that indeed there were problems in the East and the Greek Revolution would
have been established for good. Furthermore, they might have added fuel to the fire encouraging
the Greeks to increase their hostilities against the Turks.
In regard to the Conference f Verona and especially to how the British conducted their policy,
+ should give a general account of how Stratfort Canning (G. Canning’s cousin), +.+. Courtney,
Isambert and +. G. Stapleton Canning’s private secretary), viewed Canning himself and his
policy. Stratfort Canning, cousin of the new Foreign Minister of England, claims that his
cousin’s policy must be related to his personality as this was farmed during his youth. He gives
us same extracts of poems that G. Canning wrote about Greece when he was 9 years old saying
that these poems would serve “as for the indications they afford of the source where our young
author derived the first elements of that character which he displayed in afterlife.” (Str. Canning,
29). Further down, Str. Canning gives a general idea of Canning’s foreign policy: “To our
foreign relations he gave a tone which had the effect of maintaining our national dignity without
compromising the country’s peace, although he had often to deal with powers either hostile to
our Constitutional system or jealous to our commercial prosperity. He laid the foundations of
Greek independence, he limited the action of despotic influence abroad;” (Str. Canning, 41).
Courtney, on the other hand, believes that “Mr. Canning soon came to recognize the impropriety
for our joining in the attempts to prevent internal changes in several European countries, and
was thus led to maintain the policy and duty of non-interference.” and that Canning also
considered it vain to prevent any manifestations of national content. However, Courtney adds
that Canning did not adopt right from the beginning a concrete stance to the Greek issue as he did
with Spain (Courtney, 1897, 373). Similarly, Isambert says that “Nothing at the Congress of
Vienna announced openly that there was a change of policy in England” (Isambert, 1900, 149)
and he gives quotation of Stapleton’s: “England has not the right to intervene in the Orient. She
is obliged to respect the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire to the same degree that she would
like others to respect Hers. The above statement, it is true, shows no signs that Canning was
considering of helping the Greeks in any way. Sometimes, though, the real truth lies under
apparent truths. Namely, Canning was aware that any attempt of his to help the Greeks either
directly or indirectly would provoke his allies, which he wanted to avoid at all costs. In this
respect he had somehow to appease the suspicions of the Great Powers and try to exercise a
neutral attitude, at least during and short after the Congress of Verona.
George Canning
But what happened and how did this Congress end? Actually Isambert argues that this Congress
was the epilogue of the abandonment of the Greeks from Tsar Alexander due to a memorandum,
to the Porte in November, 1822. According to the terms of this memorandum, Turkey had, first
to guarantee amnesty to the Greeks, second to evacuate the Principalities and third to raise the
restrictions concerning trade and passage through the Straits. This memorandum was basically
aiming at the reestablishment of the diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey (something
that both Austria and England wanted and worked for). Furthermore, it was vital for the
commercial activities of Russia and also it could probably appease the Greeks and slow dawn
hostilities in the area (Isambert, 142).
In any case, it would be naive to accept that this diplomatic step of Russia was taken to relieve
the Greeks per se. Additionally, it is needless to say that what the Tsar did was appreciated by
Great Britain and Austria who thought that a Russo-Turkish war had been avoided, at least for
the moment.
Prince Metternich
However, after the Congress of Verona, on 14 February 1823, Canning sent a letter to Stradford,
the British ambassador in Constantinople, ordering him to inform the Porte that England would
not maintain the earlier friendly relations with Turkey unless the Porte changed its attitude
toward her Christian subjects. In March 1823 he also formally recognized the Greek blockades
against the Turks. Of course it is plausible that this recognition was aiming at the protection of
the British vessels from the Greek pirates and Anderson further claims that “it meant no
weakening of Britain’s neutral attitude in the struggle.” (Andersan, 58). Nevertheless, no matter
what was the real reason behind Canning’s recognition of the blockades of the Greeks, it still
was important for the Greeks since the outcome was the same. Canning took further actions: he
replaced +. Maitland, the British High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands who was against the
new policy of Canning, with Fr. Adam. These we could say are the very first actions denoting
the shift of the British policy concerning the Greek cause.
Nevertheless, before I refer to Canning’s policy as this was shaped in the year 1824, I shall try
to figure out what events or thoughts triggered Canning to alter it. Because even if we accept as
true that Canning’s sympathy for the plight of the Greeks was genuine, it is not a reason, strong
enough, for statesman to base his policy on. Accordingly, some of us would ask: what were
those facts that brought Canning’s philhellenism on the surface? First, it is true that even before
G. Canning held his post at Foreign Office, there was a rather strong philhellenic tendency
among the British people and some were actively involved in the Greek War of Independence:
Lord Byron, General Thomas Gordon, and Abney Hastings. The sympathy that the British people
felt for the Greeks could not let Canning unaffected. Actually, Finley writes: “the British
government consequently opposed to the revolution; but it had not, like that of Russia, the power
to coerce the sympathies of the Britons.” (Finley, 2).
Stratford Canning
Yet, the growing British philhellenism could not had been enough to make Canning change his
policy toward the Greeks. For, Great Britain, before the Greek Revolution which changed
dramatically the picture in the East, had serious economic reasons to long for a strong and
unified Ottoman Empire. The first reason was that the Russians had at all costs to be kept away
from the Mediterranean Sea. The second reason was that the Ottoman Empire provided the
British with safe passage to India. A third point was that England wanted to maintain the
position she had at the Ionian Islands. But if she was to accept the slow disintegration of the
Ottoman Empire and an independent Greek state, she would not be able to justify her position in
the Ionians.
However, speaking from a military point of view, the years 1821-1823 had been quite