Ренессанс Капитал нанимает от 200 до 250 человек, так как они стремятся извлечь выгоду из наличия опытных менеджеров в то время как «большая часть конкурентов еще не оправилась», не только в России, но и на других развивающихся рынках, говорит Мартин.
«Опытный талант гораздо более доступен, чем это было на повышающемся рынке», сказал Мартин.
Однако, люди, пытающиеся вернуться на работу, будут вдохновлены признаками снижения неустойчивости и надеждами на то, что экономика начала восстанавливается, пока они искали работу.
«Это всего лишь вопрос ожидания новых вакансий, чтобы соответствовать росту, который банки видят в данный момент», говорит Рис, из Star Search. «Банки были очень осторожны, и не нанимали людей из-за слухов о второй волне в первом квартале этого года, которая, к счастью, не случилась».
Оригиналтекста
Moscow lures top bankers
11/03/2010
Ed Bentley
Moscow's banks are battling it out for top managers as they stake their claims to dominate the country's rejuvenated stock markets, but many more junior employees remain out of work.
As Russia's stock market has almost tripled in the last 12 months, banks are betting on experience so they can take advantage of a renewed appetite for risky assets.
"Several of our investment banking and asset management clients are looking to execute ambitious business plans again and this means hiring experienced bankers," said Karl Franzmann, the new head of the banking practice at Antal Russia Recruitment.
Top managers within emerging markets have been the priority for Russian banks looking to get back on their feet after the crisis, with companies happy to swoop on their rivals.
"About 90 per cent of all the hires we've been involved in have been of Russian nationals who've been employed and taken from one bank to another," said Nick Rees, managing director of recruitment firm Star Search.
When the crisis hit in 2008, banks sacrificed lots of people quickly while retaining their core team, but those cut mostly remain out of work while banks compete for the top names.
There's "a significant amount" of people out of work in the banking sector, said Rees. "Even as recently as last week one of the major banks released 12 people."
Some experts maintain that while Russia was booming, there was a shortage of talented bankers and the crisis gave firms a chance to cut the dead wood. Now, only people with the right skills will be snapped up by banks that are recruiting.
"The Russian market grew so fast and was so short of the expertise it needed to grow [that] these new entrants to the market are eagerly being hired by the firms who have long-term commitment to the Russian market and confident growth strategies," said Franzmann.
Analysts say that most new staff are being recruited in revenue-creating positions, in particular investment bankers. But with the threat of a second wave crisis still in employers' minds, people are needed to control the risks.
The wave of new jobs is being driven by firms starting to dust off the plans that had been shelved when the crisis hit, while new action is expected on the equity markets.
"In 2010 we are seeing not just small and medium-sized deals but jumbo deals like the Rusal IPO," said Quinn Martin, head of communications at Renaissance Capital, which was a book runner for the Rusal listing.
Other Russian firms, particularly those in metals and mining, are weighing up offerings of their own and banks will be looking to take a slice of this pie.
Renaissance Capital is hiring between 200 and 250 people as they seek to capitalise on the availability of experienced managers while "much of the competition is still reeling", not just within Russia but also other emerging markets, said Martin.
"Senior talent is much more available than it was in the bull market," said Martin.
However, people trying to get back into employment will be buoyed by signs of decreasing volatility and hopes that the economy is recovering as they look for work.
"It's just a matter of waiting for new vacancies to match the growth that banks are seeing at the moment," said Rees, of Star Search. "The banks have been very careful not to hire because of rumours of a second wave in the first quarter of this year, which fortunately hasn't happened."
continuous tense глагол аннотация письмо
4. Аннотацияктексту “Is Russia Playing a Fiscal Roullete?”
Artifice of CBR
If the Central Bank of Russia not interfered in the currency trade, the dollar exchange rate would have been based on free market principles - that is, substantially less than 27 rubles per $1. And raw material exporters would have received twice less income.
In order to prevent this CBR regularly issues so-called cash emissions – a practice that is completely beyond public control. And this ensures the maintenance of the U.S. dollar rate on the exchange market.
By keeping the dollar exchange rate at 27 rubles per $1, the financial authorities forced the whole country to buy dollars at double their market value. Thus profiting the raw material exporters.
Above all, the price of raw materials and related resources in Russia tends to exceed the normal domestic market prices by two or three times.
For example, cement in Bulgaria costs $5 per ton, and with the dollar exchange 27 rubles per $1 and with transportation costs, import duties, VAT and other overheads, the cement exported from Bulgaria will be 4, 000 rubles per ton.
As a result of CBR policy, Russians have to pay the raw materials producers double or triple the amount they should. People can not know about this, because they don’t buy raw materials, but they pay this price by buying products made of these materials.
Trillions at stake
Whereas in the world's mean statistical product, the raw material component does not exceed 20 percent, in Russia the figure stands around 50 percent. This makes enterprises to go bankrupt and close, people lose their jobs and that’s why domestic economy is suffering, verging on collapse.
As a result, the population overpays another 3 trillion rubles to raw material producers. In 2005, thanks to CBR's efforts, Russia overpaid about 6 trillion rubles, or more than one-third of the nation's GDP that year.
The taxes from the 6 trillion income of raw material producers collected by the Finance Ministry, are given as production taxes, taking there for only 4 trillion rubles. The remaining 2 trillion rubles are shown as a result of their effective operation.
This money does not return to the economy, but only a boom at specific points, such as the stock market, the real estate market, and foreign car sales. This only harms the economy.
The Finance Ministry receives another 2 trillion rubles in taxes and duties from industries unrelated to the raw materials sector.
8 trillion rubles was taken away from the country's population. But the impression is given that that the raw materials exporters feed the whole country.
Оригиналтекста
Is Russia Playing Fiscal Roulette?
For starters, let us consider the year 2005. At that time, Russia's exports exceeded $250 billion. The owners of these resources - exporters - sold about $220 billion on the domestic market, at a rate of about 27 rubles per $1, thus receiving about 6 trillion rubles as a result. Had the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) not interfered in the currency trade, the dollar exchange rate would have been based on free market principles - that is, substantially less than 27 rubles per $1. In 2005, it would have been, for example, 14 rubles per $1 and raw materials exporters would have received not 6 trillion rubles but only 3 trillion for the hard currency they sold on the internal market.
To prevent this from happening, the Central Bank regularly issues so-called cash emissions - a practice that is completely beyond public control. In other words, it prints and puts into circulation money that is not covered by goods or services, spending it on the currency exchange as the largest buyer of foreign currency. The level of this intervention is such that it ensures the maintenance of the U.S. dollar rate on the exchange market. For example, in 2005, the Central Bank had to buy about $70 billion for that purpose, paying about 2 trillion rubles. Thus, it was forced to issue an additional 1 trillion rubles.
By keeping the dollar exchange rate at 27 rubles per $1, the financial authorities forced the whole country to buy dollars from raw material producers at double their market value. In other words, in addition to the Central Bank, the country's population directly or indirectly bought another $150 billion from the raw materials exporters for 4 trillion rubles, thus paying them 2 trillion rubles in excess.
It must be said that foreign exchange is bought not only by those who buy it outright, but virtually by all those who pay for related services and goods. Thus, in 2005, as a result of Central Bank manipulation, raw materials exporters were paid about 3 trillion rubles over and above what they should have been paid.
But this is only half the problem. In this context, the price of raw materials and related resources in Russia tends to exceed the normal domestic market prices by two or three times.
In a free market economy, one of the main price regulators on the internal market is the price of analogous imported goods.
For example, if cement imported from Bulgaria costs $50 per ton, with the dollar exchange rate of 14 rubles per $1, it would be 700 rubles per ton of cement excluding transportation costs, import duties, VAT, and other overheads (1,400 rubles per ton including all of these). But with the rate of the dollar twice as high, the price of Bulgarian cement on the Russian market will be in excess of 3,000 rubles per ton, which will enable domestic cement producers to offer it at 3,000 per ton.
Furthermore, due to certain specifics of the Russian market (large distances, artificially sustained local monopolist practices, the private interests of the procuring agencies, etc.), the price of cement can be as high 4,000 rubles per ton, whereas in Bulgaria it will be $5 per ton.
To sum up, as a result of CBR policy, Russians have to pay the raw materials producers double or triple the amount they should. Moreover, sometimes people simply do not know about this because they do not buy the majority of raw materials or related goods directly. Therefore, they are mostly outraged by the soaring gasoline prices. At the same time, they also overpay for natural gas, electricity, mineral fertilizer, and diesel fuel when they buy foodstuffs and pay their utility bills; for aviation fuel when they buy air tickets; for paper when they buy books and newspapers; for cement and other construction materials when they buy or build homes; for heating oil and coal when they pay for heating, and so forth.
A paradoxical situation has developed: Whereas in the world's mean statistical product, the raw material component does not exceed 20 percent, in Russia the figure stands around 50 percent. This makes it impossible for the processing, agricultural and food industries, as well as many service providers, to operate profitably. Enterprises are going bankrupt and closing, people are losing their jobs and wages, while producers are losing buyers. The domestic economy is suffering, verging on collapse.
As a result, the population overpays another 3 trillion rubles to raw material producers. In 2005, thanks to CBR's efforts, Russia overpaid about 6 trillion rubles, or more than one-third of the nation's GDP that year.
Later, the Finance Ministry, as it collects taxes from the 6 trillion that was effectively given away to the raw materials producers, pretends that these are production taxes, therefore taking, for example, only 4 trillion. The remaining "windfall" 2 trillion rubles form "super profits" and are shown in the books as a result of their effective operation, as well as the purportedly natural profitability of Russia's raw materials sectors.
This money does not return to the economy, but only a boom at specific points, such as the stock market, the real estate market, and foreign car sales. This only harms the economy insofar as it creates anti-market imbalances. It turns out that raw materials producers, who incidentally cause enormous environmental damage to the country, not only do not pay any taxes, but on the contrary, receive a subsidy from Russia's poverty stricken population at a rate of approximately 6 trillion rubles a year.
The Finance Ministry receives another 2 trillion rubles in taxes and duties from industries unrelated to the raw materials sector. In other words, in 2005, 8 trillion rubles was taken away from the country's population, whereas on paper it is made to look as though the raw materials producers contributed 4 trillion, with other sectors injecting a mere 2 trillion, thus giving the impression that the raw materials exporters feed the whole country.
What is this if not a fiscal scam of great proportions?
5. Деловое письмо
HOWARD & PRATT
Ladies’ Clothing
306, 3d Avenue
Chicago, III. 60602
USA
JACSON & MILES
118 Regent Street
London WIC 37D
UK
Gentlemen:
We saw a collection of women’s dresses in your October catalogue. The lines you showed would be most suitable for our market.
Would you kindly send us your quotation for clothing that you could supply to us by the end of November?
We would require 1000 dresses in each of the sizes 10-14, and 500 in sizes 8 and 16.
We propose the payment made by Letter of Credit.
Thank you for an early reply.
Very truly yours,
P. Pratt, Jr
ManagerBuyers
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12. Moscow News № 08F 2010. 10.03.2010