16. Reasoning of Pier Rabardel
In spite of substantial distinctions between such concepts as артефакт and instrument, most authors, however, distinguish three poles obviously (and sometimes and unobvious), plugged in the situations of the use of instrument: subject (user, operator, worker, acting person); instrument (instrument, machine, system, domestic utensil, product); object on which through an instrument an action (matter, reality, object of activity or labor, other subject) is directed. Артефакт is simultaneously an intermediate and mediator between a subject and object.. Intermediate position of instrument does him in actual fact by the neurohumor of relations between a subject and object. An instrument makes an intermediate universe main description of which consists in her double adapted - in relation to a subject and object. Adaptation is understood both in sense of material properties and in cognitive or semiotics sense, depending on the type of activity in which an instrument is included or for including, which he is intended in. Two main orientations of mediated differentiate: mediated in direction from an object to the subject, which we characterize as epistemic mediated, where an instrument is a mean, allowing to carry out cognition of object; in direction from a subject to the object - pragmatic mediated, at which an instrument is a transforming mean (including control and adjusting in wide sense), directed to the object. But as soon as it mediated is written into the real activity, him epistemic and pragmatic dimensions constantly intersect within the framework of this activity. Thus, an instrument is not only an intermediate universe but also mean of action and, more widely, to activity. Herein there is his second substantial description. Essence of these actions, naturally, is very various: transformation of material object through a hand instrument: material instrument; cognitive decision-making, for example, in the situation of management a dynamic environment: cognitive instrument; management own activity: psychological instrument; semiotics co-operating with a semiotics object or with other subject: semiotics instrument. Within the framework of action an instrument makes operant. He is operative in that sense, that undertakes implementation of part of task: he carries out work. Nature of this work and what she touches, obviously, related to the objects of activity, in this connection, very various. An instrument is the mean of concrete single action, but his value has much more general character; he wider than singleness of nowadays and is meaningful for the whole class of actions and situations.Thus, an instrument is simultaneously in regard to adaptation to the operating situation and in regard to independence from her. Through such maintenance an instrument becomes the mean of capitalization of the accumulated experience (some authors talk even about crystallization). In this sense any instrument is knowledge. It is knowledge which is entered in a development process and which is accumulated in the great number of situations and at the different variants of the use of instrument such. From this point of view, the last can be examined as one of forms of the external fixing of specific experience. This knowledge, which a subject can appropriate in adequate activity which must be unfolded by the adapted character and which can, certainly, carried out by means of other subjects (one of forms of mediated on Vigotskiy and Leontewu).It also is own knowledge of subject, characterizing forms and methods of relations of subject to the object, expressing them and, the same, being a source of possible supervisions for a psychologist. It is knowledge, accumulated simultaneously in the process of transformation of material device, making artifacts, and in the use related to him, in the methods of application. Thus, instrument as well as sign, presenting for some authors not that another, as special case of instrument, it is ambivalent, complex integrity, simultaneously артефактом and method the uses which fundamentally not разделимы.
17. Reasoning of Howard Hardener
Certainly, present means progress in area of psychology of development in explanation that, how individuals arrive at different cognitive and communicative capabilities. We have some key concepts about by a logically by a ration thought, about a language and other symbolic systems. But empiric, problem-oriented nature of greater part of researches on psychology of development, creates difficulty for those, who to aim to affect more all-purpose, but also thinner, difficult perceptible themes, styles of value, which are also included in understanding of culture. The method of achievement of competence (for example, in a political sphere) or role (for example, roles of friend) absents in psychology of development. In the total skepticism appears concerning that, whether there are these difficult perceptible themes in principles by suitable themes for the advanced study. From this point of view anthropologists experience difficulty in that, to assert reality of culture. Really, "super-organic" makes the head stone of this discipline. However in this case resistance to determination of culture is created, as life of individual can in general absent here. Id est there is a paradox in determination of acceptance of culture. A culture is the same necessary part of surroundings of child, as air, which he breathes and as fairy-tales which he listens. There are many researches about perception of culture, done as within the framework of psychology of development, so within the framework of cultural anthropology: many of the last are executed in psychoanalytical tradition and tradition of school "Culture and Personality". But it should be noted that these most works concentrated on a question, as an individual develops as personality, but not as individuals develop as fruitful and interactive members of the examined culture. Small attention spared to the processes by means of which individuals develop a cognitive competence are those capabilities and ways of thinking, which are required by mastering of different roles in technological and economic spheres of their society. Such blank unsurprising foremost because contiguity with cognition only recently affected psychology and yet later anthropological sciences. To work out the all-purpose theory of mastering of culture comparative researches are needed. But we need not only new information about the processes of development in the different corners of the world, but we does not possess even an acceptable category chart for comparison and analysis of these researches. To attain our purpose we must do a few preliminary remarks. A culture must not be examined as single, inviolable, not differentiable integrity. Opposite, for heuristic approach it is necessary to divide a culture on a separate area, each of which can be analyzed separately. Description of area includes judgments and flexibility. An area can be in relation to wide, as a cognitive area by comparison to a social area, or very specific, as an area of algebra or nuclear physics. Fundamentally here that everybody can legally investigate the private area of achievement into a culture, to describe select the eventual state is inherent to the adult member of culture, and then to begin to determine different steps and stages on the way of achievement of this eventual state. Such "regional approach" implies that initially a young organism into society has a competence in this area. Such supposition sets much work to the social researchers, and those, who supposes, that a competence is to a great extent the genetically determined process (as Chomsky considered), and those, who supposes that achievement of competence is completely the result of teaching (as behaviorists) process, and those, who prefers approach related to instinctive co-operation (as Piage), and to many psychologists of development… In addition to this statement about existence and autonomy of different areas of competence, we developing the theory of the cultural understanding, must look at her from four different points of view. First two can be examined as diametrically opposite to one other. From one side it is a culture as unit, including the different areas, beliefs and values. Other extreme point of view is an individual, equipped by his genetic legacy, including different neurological and psychological mechanisms. The third point of view is the system of symbols, being into a culture. Fourth - modus of transmission of the cultural understanding… I consider a necessity to consider three spheres, which necessarily must be compared in the different corners of the world. It is a 1) physical world, 2) the world, artifact created by a man, 3) the social world. In every culture a man must find funds, in an order to purchase capabilities, enabling to him effectively deal with these three spheres. Moreover, an individual must develop these capabilities both at intuitional and practical level and at the level of explicit cognition. An individual must attain and «know as well as «know that» in all these spheres. Certainly, between cultural distinctions in methods which these cultural knowledge are coded, passed and realized makes a main question for philosophers, anthropologists and other social researchers. Cultures considerably differentiate in regard to methods which they determine these three spheres (and making their areas), in the gamut of more or less explicit forms cognitions which embrace every sphere and, that can be it is most important, in values which they have in every culture.
Examining an individual, as opposition to the culture, we mean biological organism, human creature which since total ignorance about the concrete culture, it must in a flow 10 - 20 years to attain a satisfactory competence, so that effectively to carry out productive work and effectively to co-operate with other individuals, leaning against the genetic legacy. The theory of understanding of culture must take into account that, that is known about the genetic legacy of man : structure of the nervous system, principles of development of brain, action of early and late experience of the neurological and psychological maturing and what role, this experience plays in understanding of culture… Foremost I will be stopped for intellectual component, which human creatures, as kind, are potentially able to grasp, id est on cognitive potential. I suppose that 7 informatively-judicial systems are at least, which a human creature, as kind, must grasp. It is a 1) Linguistic competence. 2) The Spatial competence. 3) Logic- metamatematics competence. 4) The Musical competence. 5) Corporal-motive competence. 6) Interpersonally competence. 7) Inwardly personality competence... Creation (or instrument what that was not, body of culture (related to cognition factor of А), passed to the individual together with his individual the competence (factor of B) is determined here by me as a symbolic system. It is the system of elements, sometimes physical as pictures or texts, sometimes non-material - as the outspoken words or unspoken ideas in which cognition can be overcame and passed from one individual to other. As values influence on a conduct and experience it is studied poorly. As an initial point we can suppose that a child is predisposition to perceive them, searches them, and as a result, values appear grasped in experience in an earliest period of life. Id est individuals, objects, locations etc. are for a young organism the understood values… Symbolic the system is the crystallized maintenance or cognition of culture... Point of contact between a culture, with her valued forms, and individual, with his intellectual predisposition, there is symbolic system: forms of crystallization of cognition into a culture, in which an individual conducts the early child's years which, it is possible to say, sets the system of values into this culture. The method of transmission can be varied from a simple supervision to the specialized teaching and from own family to modern electronic facilities.
So, as we see, the spectrum of determinations of culture is enormous. Ethno psychology cannot take one prepared determination, and must construct own, adequate to her aims and tasks.
LIST OF LITERATURE
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