Белорусский Государственный Университет
Гуманитарный факультет
Кафедра общенаучных дисциплин
Курсовая работа
по страноведению
TheUKasamemberoftheEU
Студентки 3 курса
Специальности СИЯ-КО
Кореньковой Н.Н.
Научный руководитель
Старший преподаватель
Рябова И.В
Минск – 2009
Content
Introduction
Chapter 1. History and reasons of the EU creation
1.1 A peaceful Europe (1945-1959)
1.1.1 The Robert Schuman declaration, 9 May 1950
1.2 Attempts of Britain
1.3 Government of M. Thatcher
1.4 The Treaty of Maastricht
1.5 Government of T. Blair
1.5.1 Social Chapter
1.5.2 The Treaty of Nice
1.5.3 Treaty of Accession
1.5.4 Under the Constitutional Treaty
Chapter 2. European economic integration
2.1 European Community Budget
2.1.1The budget as a source of problems among the EU partners
2.1.2 Budgetary revenues and expenditures
2.1.3 Reforms
2.2 Common Agricultural Policy
2.2.1 CAP objectives
2.2.2 CAP policies
2.2.3 UK policies
2.2.4 CAP inconsistencies
2.2.5 The 1992 and 1999 reforms
2.2.6 The 2003 reforms
2.2.7 The 2007-08 CAP Heath check
2.3 Economic and Monetary Union
2.3.1 European Monetary Union: reasons and history
2.3.2 Benefits and costs
2.3.3 The UK case
2.3.4 Summary and conclusions
Chapter 3. Politic integration the EU and the UK
3.1 Common foreign and security policy
3.1.1 Aims
3.1.2 The Main Players in CFSP
3.1.3 Common Security & Defense Policy (CSDP)
3.1.4 Conclusion
3.2 European constitution
3.2.1 The British Constitutional option: No constitution
3.2.2 Option 2: a none cosmetic revision
Conclusion
References
Introduction
The topic of my project is “The UK as a member of the EU”, which I have choose for my course paper. I consider this topic to be very actual and significant, because nowadays the European Union is the greatest political and economic centre of the world, an intergovernmental and supranational union of 27 democratic member states. The Union is constantly pretending to be the leader in world policy, but it has resistance on the part of several Member States. Traditionally Britain is one of them. Reason of such relations lies in a number of historical, cultural, political and economic factors. Relations with the EU for Britain are one of priority directions of policy, but at the same time the UK is craving for soverenity and independence and trying to keep influence on the political arena. That is why we can say “Britain is in the European Union, but not with it”.
The purpose of my project is to examine political and economic role of the UK in Europe.
I have established following problems for performance of the purpose of the project:
1. Reasons of creation the EU and prerequisites for Britain to enter the Union
2. History of relations
3. Political and economic role of the UK in Europe and main problems, connected with it
My work includes besides introduction, conclusion and 3 chapters.
Chapter 1 describes the history the EU creation, premises of British membership and problems connected with it.
Chapter 2 examines the role of GB in the European Economic Integration basically in main spheres such as Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), European Community Budget and Monetary system. Benefits and difficulties in each branch are scrutinized as well.
Chapter 3 considers political place of Britain in the Union, its influence on coming to conclusions and attitude of British government towards European Constitution.
Chapter 1. History and reasons of creating the EU
1.1 A peaceful Europe (1945-1959)
The historical roots of the European Union lie in the Second World War. Europeans are determined to prevent such killing and destruction ever happening again. Soon after the war, Europe is split into East and West as the 40-year-long Cold War begins. West European nations create the Council of Europe in 1949. It is a first step towards cooperation between them, but six countries want to go further.
economic government integration european
1.1.1 The Robert Schuman declaration, 9 May 1950
9 May 1950 – French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman presents a plan for deeper cooperation. Later, every 9 May is celebrated as “Europe Day”
18 April 1951
Based on the Schuman plan, six countries sign a treaty to run their heavy industries – coal and steel – under a common management. In this way, none can on its own make the weapons of war to turn against the other, as in the past. The six are Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Building on the success of the Coal and Steel Treaty, the six countries expand cooperation to other economic sectors.
The 1957 Treaties of Rome established the European Community (EC) and the European
Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom). The EC set out
1. to create a common market encompassing the elimination of customs duties between Member States, free movement of goods, people, services and capital;
2. the removal of distortions in competition within this market;
3. To coordinate transport;
4. establish common agricultural and economic policies.
Euratom was set up to develop a common market in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Under the Treaties of Rome, the Member States granted the European Commission a mandate to negotiate international trade agreements on their behalf.[5]
1.2 Attempts of Britain
Unlike other members, Britain had not suffered invasion in World War Two and unfortunately retained the illusion that it could play the role of a great power in its own right in partnership with the US, coincidentally up to the moment the EEC was born. The Britain's initially attempted to sponsor an alternative organization to the EEC with the creation of the European Free Trade Area in 1959 as a result of the Treaty of Stockholm. In numerical terms at least, the seven EFTA members (Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Iceland), outnumbered the six EC member states (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands); it was the EC countries that were the fast growing core of the European economy. This was clear in a memorandum sent by Prime Minister Harold Macmillian to his Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, in 1959.
For the first time since the Napoleonic era the major continental powers are united in a positive economic grouping with considerable political aspects, which, although not specifically directed against the United Kingdom, may have the effect of excluding the UK both from European markets and from consultation in European policy [2,p.136-137]
These economic and political implications motivated the first application for membership lodged by the UK in 1961 under a Conservative government. But British opponents drew on two substantial political arguments against accession.
The first related to the United Kingdom’s world role. Opponents of EC entry felt the UK should align itself with the Commonwealth countries and the USA, linking those nations to the EC, rather than risk merging into a ‘European super-state’.
The second argument focused on ’sovereignty’. The principle of supremacy alarmed a small number of British politicians. The faction feared that some of Parliament’s powers would be irretrievably lost to Community institutions. Opponents of entry argued that such a transfer of political power was undesirable. But they also argued that it was constitutionally impossible for the UK to honor the obligations EC membership entailed, since it had always been assumed that Parliament was a sovereign law-market, unable to bind either itself or its successors as Costa would require. [3, p.39]
However, new states could be admitted only with the consent of all the existing members, and on both occasions the French government, headed by De Gaulle, vetoed British entry. In many ways, De Gaulle’s vision of Europe accorded with what in later years would be seen as a distinctly Thatcherite position. De Gaulle adopted a distinctly nationalist position, distrusted EC institutions such as the Commission, and wanted to see the member state holding the upper hand. However, where he differed from Thatcherite views on Europe was that De Gaulle wanted to maintain the Franco-German axis as a key relationship within the EC with France as a dominant partner. De Gaulle also saw Europe as a third force between the US and the Soviet Union, with France at the helm. His opposition to UK membership was based on the fear that the UK would be a Trojan horse for US influence and would lead to the creation of an Atlantic Community dependent on America. Despite other member states favoring UK membership, De Gaulle imposed a unilateral veto in January 1963 based on his concern about US influence and his anger at a US-UK deal on nuclear weapons made at Nassau in July 1962 under which the US agreed to supply Polaris missiles to the UK.
Harold Wilson’s Labour Government, elected in 1964, also pursued EC membership. Wilson sought to modernize the UK economy and to adapt to the ‘white heat’ of the technological revolution. However, the application lodged by Wilson’s Government was again rebuffed by De Gaulle who expressed himself unsure of Britain’s European vocation.
The political complexion of Europe changed in 1969 when De Gaulle was replaced by George Pompidou. Although a Gaullist, Pompidou was prepared to agree to British accession. The new Social Democrat West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, also supported British membership. This combined with the election in Britain in 1970 of Edward Heath’s Conservative Government. Heath was a committed European who had made his maiden speech in the House of Commons in favor of ECSC membership. Negotiations began in June 1970 and in a 1971 White Paper outlined the implications of membership, which would include hefty budget contributions and an increased cost of living amounting to 3 % over six years, mainly linked to a 15 % increase in food prices because of the CAP.
The British negotiating team led by Geoffrey Rippon was not in a strong position. Some concessions were wrought on Commonwealth trade, but essentially, the British were forced to sign up to the 13,000 pages of EC law as it then stood (it has since risen to around 80,000 pages). Parliamentary approval was secured in October 1971 by 356 votes to 244, but only because 69 Labour MPs defied a three-line Whip to support membership. The Treaty of Accession was signed in Brussels on 22 January 1972 with Britain becoming a member of the EC on 1 January 1973. [2, p.142]
In the meantime the French Government succeeded in getting principles established for the CAP and for the financing of the Community (the own resources system) which were highly favorable to France and which Britain had to accept. In the entry negotiations the most that could be achieved was a seven year transitional period with gradually increasing financial contributions and an assurance that "if an unacceptable situation should arise, the Institutions would find equitable solutions".
When Mrs. Thatcher came to power in 1979, the 7 year transitional period was almost over and the British net contribution was indeed unacceptable. It took nearly five years and innumerable Council meetings to find the equitable solution. In most EU negotiations it is usually possible to find a solution which gives at least something to every one, even if some are not fully content. In the budget negotiation Britain was bound to be isolated because all other member states would either pay more or gain less from the budget if the British net contribution was reduced. It was a true zero sum game. After much aggravation, agreement was reached in 1984 and the British came within two thirds of a percentage point of their opening position. By now they understood better how the EC really worked and insisted that the solution should be enshrined in a revised "own resources" decision, thus ensuring that it can only be changed by ratification in all member states, (the provision originally secured by France to protect its own favorable budget position).
The European Parliament became directly elected. Steps were taken to establish policies for Research and for the Environment and for Regional Development, all favored by the British. The political cooperation (foreign policy cooperation) machinery was set up, Association Agreements were made with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) and some other important countries, the Common Fisheries Policy took (unsatisfactory) shape and, at the end of the 1970s, the European Monetary System (EMS) was created, with Britain not joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) but having the right to join later. Progress with putting into effect the Single Market was very slow, except in the field of tariff reduction.
1.3 Government of M. Thatcher
Margaret Thatcher began her campaign for the completion of the Single Market in Copenhagen in 1982. It was finally rewarded with success in Luxemburg in 1986 with agreement on the Single European Act. The key elements to this important Act were:
· Increase the EEC to 12
· Develop the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), Britain did not join this until 1990
· Increase the EEC’s control on environmental issues and other areas of national governments.
· Develop a free internal market for goods, labour and capital by 1992. This restricted the ability of individual member states to control these areas of activity.
· Increase the role of the European Parliament, thereby decreasing the role of individual national parliaments. However, UK citizens would elect MEP’s to sit in the European Parliament at Strasbourg.
The next six years were spent agreeing nearly 300 directives to create the Single Market with Jacques Delors and Arthur Cockfield (the British Commissioner) keeping Ministers hard at work. The consequences have been wholly beneficial economically, with the elimination of barriers to trade and the scrapping of restrictions on millions of firms. It has, however, had some negative side effects, as the regulations essential to create a real single market provided ammunition to those hostile to the EU, particularly in the UK.
One great internal development of the 1990s was the achievement of EMU. This had many things to be said for it. A single market without a single currency would always have been subject to attack. To be able to travel Europe-wide without changing your money is a huge advantage. But the move to EMU (European Monetary Unification) was more a political than an economic decision and the jury is still out on the question of whether all Eurozone countries will be able to live with its "one size fits all" single short-term interest rate. [2, p.156-164]
1.4 The Treaty of Maastricht
7 February 1992 the Treaty on European Union (TEU) is signed in Maastricht, entered into force on 1 November 1993.
The Maastricht Treaty based on three ‘pillars’:
1 pillar I – the EC;
2 pillar II – new intergovernmental arrangements for a CFSP;
3 Pillar III – increased co-operation on justice and home affairs.
The main provisions of the Treaty were:
· The principle of subsiduarity was embodied.
The Treaty also enshrined the principle of subsidiarity, under which action in areas where the EC and Member States share competence should be taken at European level only if objectives cannot be achieved by Member States acting alone, and can be better achieved by the EC.
· Concept of European citizenship introduced, allowing citizens in the EU to vote in European Parliament and local elections in whichever member state they live.
It introduced the concept of EU citizenship as a supplement to national citizenship.
· Institutional reform introduced – new powers to the European Parliament and extension of qualified voting majority in the Council of Ministers.
· A common foreign and security policy allowed for through intergovernmental cooperation
· Agreement on increased intergovernmental cooperation on issues such as immigration and asylum seekers.
· Move towards economic and monetary union.
The Maastricht Treaty was not welcomed among many Conservatives, even though bit was John Major who signed up to the Treaty. It had a long and difficult passage through Parliament. One major complaint was it increased the path towards federalism. Eurosceptics attacked this claiming it was the slide towards a European superstate with a huge centralized bureaucracy. However, supporters of Maastricht and federalism interpret as a means of decentralizing power, not centralizing it. Another controversial issue was monetary union. Maastricht laid down the disappearance of national currencies and the introduction of a single European currency, and the establishment of central European bank. This would have powers to set interest rates for the whole EU.The other contentious area of Maastricht was the Social Chapter. The aim was to harmonize laws across the EU on social issues such as workers rights e.g. a minimum wage; this was designed to prevent unfair competition through exploitation of workers. In order to stave off defeat at home, and keep the Conservative Party on board, John Major negotiated an opt-out of the Social Chapter claiming it would increase the costs to business.[5]