Heidegger Essay, Research Paper
Heideggers Conceptual Essences
Heideggers Conceptual Essences: Being and the Nothing, Humanism, and
Technology Being and the Nothing are the same. The ancient philosopher Lao-tzu
believed that the world entertains no separations and that opposites do not actually exist.
His grounding for this seemingly preposterous proposition lies in the fact that because
alleged opposites depend on one another and their definitions rely on their differences,
they cannot possibly exist without each other. Therefore, they are not actually opposites.
The simple and uncomplex natured reasoning behind this outrageous statement is useful
when trying to understand and describe Martin Heideggers deeply leveled philosophy of
Being and the nothing.
Lao-tzus uncomplicated rationale used in stating that supposed opposites create
each other, so they cannot be opposite, is not unlike Heideggers description of the
similarity between the opposites Being and the nothing. Unlike Lao-tzu, Heidegger does
not claim that no opposites exist. He does however say that two obviously opposite
concepts are the same, and in this way, the two philosophies are similar. He believes that
the separation of beings from Being creates the nothing between them. Without the
nothing, Being would cease to be. If there were not the nothing, there could not be
anything, because this separation between beings and Being is necessary. Heidegger even
goes so far as to say that Being itself actually becomes the nothing via its essential finity.
This statement implies a synonymity between the relation of life to death and the relation
of Being to nothingness. To Heidegger, the only end is death. It is completely absolute, so
it is a gateway into the nothing. This proposition makes Being and the nothing the two
halves of the whole. Both of their roles are equally important and necessary in the cycle of
life and death. Each individual life inevitably ends in death, but without this death, Life
would be allowed no progression: The nothing does not merely serve as the
counterconcept of beings; rather, it originally belongs to their essential unfolding as such .
Likewise, death cannot occur without finite life. In concordance with the statement that
the nothing separates beings from Being, the idea that death leads to the nothing implies
that death is just the loss of the theoretical sandwich’s bread slices, leaving nothing for the
rest of ever. The existence of death, therefore, is much more important in the whole
because it magnifies the nothing into virtually everything. The magnification of the nothing
serves as an equalizer between Being and nothing because Being is so robust and obvious
that it magnifies itself. In this case, the opposites are completely reliant on each other, not
only conceptually but physically. Heidegger gives new meaning to Lao-tzus philosophy
that opposites define each other when he tries to uncover the true essence and meaning of
Being, and he reveals another level of intertwination between the nothing and Being. In
order to define Being, it is mandatory to step outside of it, into the nothing because:
Everything we talk about, mean, and are related to in such and such a way is in Being.
What and how we are ourselves are is also in Being. Being is found in thatness and
whatness, reality, the being at hand of things [Vorhandenheit], subsistence, validity,
existence [Dasein], and in the there is [es gibt] . Heidegger is very adamant on the
importance of unbiased judgments and definitions, and how could he possibly calculate the
exact meaning of Being while viewing it from a state of Being? Thus it is necessary to step
out into the nothing to fully comprehend Being. For this reason, human beings are the only
beings capable of pondering the essence of existence and nonexistence. Dasein are the
only creatures capable because they are held out into the nothing: Being and the nothing
do belong together . . . because Being itself is essentially finite and reveals itself only in the
transcendence of Dasein which is held out into the nothing . The highest determinations of
the essence of man in humanism still do not realize the proper dignity of man. When
Heidegger rejects the title humanist, it is not because he is anti-humanity or even
pessimistic about the fate of the human race. Rather, he rejects the category because he
rightly sees humanism as defined with man at the center, which is a point of view he very
strongly rejects. Perhaps in some other era, Heidegger could fittingly be called a humanist;
however, he believes that the word humanism … has lost its meaning . The modern
connotation of humanism is not suitable for Heidegger mainly because in relation to the
cosmos, other beings, and even life itself, Heidegger believes that man is essentially out of
control. Instead of Heideggers philosophy revolving around mankind, it is centered on the
question of Being. Dasein is often the main character of Heideggers elaboration, but not
because he is the center. Instead, it is because he is the mechanism through which the
nothing and hence the answer to Being can be discovered: If the answer to the question of
Being thus becomes the guiding directive for research, then it is sufficiently given only if
the specific mode of being of previous ontology–the vicissitudes of its questioning, its
findings, and its failures–becomes visible as necessary to the very character of Dasein.
Because of their trancendence and resulting link to Being and the nothing, they are the
best route to the answer of Being. Even his focus on Dasein, however, leaves no trace of
humanistic qualities: he doesnt even keep the title human: The analysis of Dasein thus
understood is wholly oriented toward the guiding task of working out the question of
Being . When Heidegger does speak of humanitys goodness, he does not incorporate the
entire species in his statements. Only a percentage of the race is included in his vision of
humanity. This is because he sees humanity as a goal for mankind. If he were reffering to
all of humanity, wouldnt he just use the word mankind? Heidegger believes that part of
mans essence is the ability to step out of his essence. This ability he calls ekstaticism, and
it means that there is no question as to whether or not man is at the center. The answer is
no because man is actually outside of what humanity claims revolves around men. This
transcendence is often unrecognized to the point of causing man not to understand or fully
evaluate his environment, which just reiterates that he is not in control: Because man as
the one who ek-sists comes to stand in this relation that Being destines for itself, in that he
… takes it upon himself, he at first fails to recognize the nearest and attaches himself to the
next nearest. He even thinks that this is nearest . Paradoxically, this eksistence
characteristic of Dasein, which gives him the ability to transcend and reach a level of
humanity also can cause inhumane acts. In this way, the possibilities of eksistence threaten
its goals: the inhumanity that mankind is capable of threaten the very concept of humanity.
If man were at the center, he would be granted control. His control would be indicated by
his initiation, recognition, and decision. But he is not the beginning or the end, and neither
does he understand them. From the point of view of Heidegger, control is something men
obviously lack. Man is not even in control of his own existence. He does not decide to be
given life. Being is given to man, but man does not command it; man occurs essentially in
such a way that he is the there … that is, the clearing of Being. Man through thinking takes
over this gift, but does not own it. Man does not even own his thoughts. Being does not
revolve around man. Man is thrown into his eksistence; Da-sein itself occurs essentially as
thrown. Man revolves around Being, and serves as one of Beings expressions. Humanity
believes that because man is the center, it is his place to rule over all other life forms on
the planet. Heidegger strongly refutes this notion. He recognizes the elementary aspect to
the logic applied in the claim that because men are more intelligent than animals, they are
better. First of all, men are not mere animals. They exist differently because of their ability
to step out of their essence and into the nothing. People and animals are different, so they
are not comparable. The elementary concept that man is an animal better than other
animals implies prejudice against less intellectual persons. Technologys essence,
relationship with man, and future are at the hands of Being, not humanity. Heidegger’s
views of technology and its relation to ethics are complicated and difficult, not unlike his
views on nearly everything else. He saw the journey of technology as an inevitable process
that began slowly but quickened via its vicissitudes. He sees the process as a means to an
end. However, this “means to an end” is different from most “means to an end” because its
“end” is more “means,” so it inevitably progresses faster and faster. In other words, the
result of technology is more and more technology in larger and larger amounts. Also, he
believed that its progression is out of our control. Technology is inarguably the result of
thinking. Heidegger claims that no thought is original in that the thinker does not actually
conjure it. Rather, the thought reveals itself to the thinker, even if he is the first person to
ever think of it. So, human beings are not the creators of technology even if they created it
because the thinker only respond[s] to what address[es] itself to him. In this way,
technology existed even before some prehistoric ape scraped some bugs out of a piece of
bark with a twig. This means that there must be some other cause for technology besides
man. Heidegger says, thinking, propriated by Being, belongs to Being. At the same time
thinking is of Being insofar as thinking, belonging to Being, listens to Being. As the
belonging to Being that listens, thinking is what it is according to its essential origin. The
combonation of these two quotes means that Being actually created technology with
thought as its messenger to humanity. The handing over of the invention of technology to
Being intensely complicates things. Now finding technologys essence becomes almost as
difficult as finding Beings definition. Of course, it was necessary for Heidegger to
understand the essence of technology. The importance is due to the fact that man cannot
gain control or understanding of technology without knowing its essence and attaining a
free relationship with it. By free, he means free of bondage, subjectivity, and slavery. One
cannot objectively calculate the implications of technology while bound to it by lifestyle,
opinionated about it, or reliant on it to the point of slavery. This freedom is granted by
looking at the big picture, way back before technology in the modern sense existed, even
with the apes. This allows one to view technology with unbiased eyes. Then, the will to
mastery becomes all the more urgent the more tecchnology threatens to slip from human
control. The only control humanity has over technology is in internal will that leads to
understanding of the essence and eventually to mastery. Technology’s essence has two
equal conceptual divisions which are reliant on each other: Technology as instrumental
and as a human activity. Its means that lead to more means also have two characters: that
of revealing and that of self-creation. Thus, technology is an instrumental human activity
that self-creates its revealing with vicissitude. It cannot be controlled unless the
complexity of these concepts are understood.
All phenomenologists follow Husserl in attempting to use pure description. Thus,
they all subscribe to Husserl’s slogan ?To the things themselves.? They differ among
themselves, however, as to whether the phenomenological reduction can be performed,
and as to what is manifest to the philosopher giving a pure description of experience. The
German philosopher Martin Heidegger, Husserl’s colleague and most brilliant critic,
claimed that phenomenology should make manifest what is hidden in ordinary, everyday
experience. He thus attempted in Being and Time (1927; trans. 1962) to describe what he
called the structure of everydayness, or being-in-the-world, which he found to be an
interconnected system of equipment, social roles, and purposes.
Because, for Heidegger, one is what one does in the world, a phenomenological
reduction to one’s own private experience is impossible; and because human action
consists of a direct grasp of objects, it is not necessary to posit a special mental entity
called a meaning to account for intentionality. For Heidegger, being thrown into the world
among things in the act of realizing projects is a more fundamental kind of intentionality
than that revealed in merely staring at or thinking about objects, and it is this more
fundamental intentionality that makes possible the directness
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