Lastly, and most important of all, there has been a breech in the invisible barrier which has kept terrorists from using chemical weapons in the past. The CIA has warned that if this barrier were breached by “one successful incident in volving such [lethal] agents [it] would significantly lower the threshold of restraint on their application by other terrorists” (Anderson). This barrier was composed of fear and uncertainty. The terrorists were afraid of the consequences of such a weap on and the danger to themselves, and they were uncertain of the success of such an attack. Now, after the sarin attack in Japan in March, it is obvious how effective a small amount of chemical agent is at tying down a subway system, injuring thousands of people, and enraging people all over the world. This essentially opened the door to a whole new form of terrorism. The only thing now keeping terrorists from using chemical weapons is their lack of knowledge, and once they realize that the production o f these weapons is well within the scope of their operations, there will be very little left to stop them.
Solutions
Now, with the threats becoming more and more real every day, one needs to consider what could be done to counter this great danger. To start with, counter terrorist organizations must continue with their information gathering and observations of terrorist organizations. The first specific step is that precursor chemicals or potential chemical weapons must be better regulated. Then response capabilities must be increased and improved to deal with chemical attacks, this should inc lude an improvement in chemical detection capabilities. And finally, the public must be better informed on the subject of chemical attacks, in specific “What to do in an emergency.”
Restricting chemicals used to make CW (chemical warfare) agents or used as CW agents, may be the least effective method of preventing terrorists from using chemical weapons. This merely increases the costs for a group to obtain their weapons. It does, however, reduce the chances of a “casual” terrorist using chemical weapons. The casual terrorist may not be willing to go through the difficulties of obtaining chemical weapons due to time considerations or a loss in motivation. Another way restrictions would help reduce CW is through the methods outlined in the Chemical Weapons Conference. This prevents the development or sale of chemical weapons by any of the signatory nations, and thus reduces the number of sources from whic h terrorists can acquire their weapons.
An improvement in preparedness for chemical attacks and the organization of a special team of experts for response to chemical attacks would be more successful than simply a restriction on chemicals. Many emergency agencies (like poli ce, fire departments, and hospitals) aren’t adequately supplied and trained to deal with chemical attacks, especially on a large scale. Just a slight increase in instruction on how to identify the signs of a chemical attack and deal with those affected m ay make quite a difference. Even more important would be the development of a government response team specifically trained to deal with large chemical attacks could improve the United States response capability drastically. This team would be composed of experts in the field of chemical weapons, the effects of those weapons and decontamination people and equipment. The number of capable people in this field is quite large but consists of mainly military personnel. What needs to be established is quic k method of deployment of these people and their equipment. Along with this skilled response team there needs to be increased detection capabilities. Most desirable would be a device which could be integrated into current airport x-ray and detection equ ipment. The increase in a counter terrorist group’s capability of detecting chemical weapons has the obvious advantage of preventing an attack before it happens. This should clearly be a priority of government officials.
Increased public knowledge is probably the best defense or response to the new chemical weapon threat. The ideal case would be a public knowledge campaign to teach people what the threats are and how to identify the signs of a chemica l weapon attack. It is, of course, impractical to expect such a “Just say no to chemical weapons” campaign to be implicated or even be listened to at this stage. But as soon as the people of the United States realize the threat it might become necessary . For the time being, education can be on the managerial level. Large corporations, schools, and buildings alike may designate a group of people to become educated in what to do in the event of such an emergency. This group could in turn instruct the m asses of people in an emergency. Likely targets of chemical attacks could also instruct their personnel and post signs regarding the response to such an emergency. For instance, if subway workers in the March incident, had been able to identify that che mical attack more quickly, their lives as well as the lives of others may have been saved. This increase in awareness would most likely contribute greatly to a reduction of chemical weapon casualties.
A Brief Conclusion
These possible solutions could seriously reduce the effectiveness of a terrorist chemical weapon attack. This type of attack has been in the public eye for a month now and has been lingering in the back of terrorist minds for ma ny years. Now with this increase in publicity everybody knows the terrifying effects of chemical weapons and it’s really only a matter of time before the United States has to deal with a similarly terrifying event.
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