The Falklands War
The Falklands war of 1982 was a notable exception to the general postwar pattern of indecisive naval combat. Here, maritime airpower had a profound effect upon surface vessels operations. Land-based Argentinean strike aircraft sank six ships (two destroyers, two frigates, a container ship functioning as an aircraft carrier, and a fleet auxiliary) and damaged a further thirteen (four destroyer, six frigates, and three fleet auxiliaries); British carrier ship-based aircraft and helicopters sank or forced the abandonment of six vessels (a submarine, two patrol boats, a trawler, and two freighters), and damaged another patrol boat. British maritime superiority enabled all other British naval and amphibious operations to occur.
The Falkland campaign was notable for dramatically highlighting the value of antishipping missiles such as the Exocet and the Sea Skua, shipboard surface-to-air missiles, and the leverage offered by the British Aerospace Sea Harrier armed with advanced air-to-air missiles. Also shown again was the vulnerability of large capital ships to submarine attack. In particular, this war also illuminated the increasing threat to ships by maritime air attack and, especially, to the vulnerabilities of many newer vessels (less armored than their predecessors of WW II, in part because of their having heavier topsides for carrying extensive electronic equipment) to even unsophisticated and, indeed, obsolescent attackers dropping conventional non-precision ?iron? bombs. Newer ships were heavily damaged or even sunk, even when weapons did not explode.
In fact, what is often missed is that the British victory owed as much to the operational inexperience?s of Argentinean airmen and bomb fusing problems as it did to the skill and technological advantages of its own force, and the tremendous logistical accomplishment of equipping and moving such a force so far in a relatively brief period of time. Of 22 bombs that struck British ships, 12 failed to detonate, and one detonated late. Thus fully 55% of Argentinean bombs failed to explode, even though they hit their targets. Had they done so, it is likely that the British task force would have been so weakened that they would not have been able to operate in the waters around the islands. That, of course, was a precondition for taking them, and would have spelt disaster for the entire expedition.
The effects such a defeat would have had on the subsequent history of the 1980?s, especially the European governments, is profound. While I only speculate, it is likely that a defeat in the Falklands would have seen the Thatcher government falling, perhaps fatally weakening the strong alliance of the U.S. and Great Britain that did much to bolster European resistance as NATO faced the Soviet Union in the latter and more serious years of the Cold War. Thanks to a few more bombs exploding, the loss of a sea war thousands of miles from Europe might have had a dramatically different ending, and vastly affected the balance of power in Europe.
Since the Falklands
The lessons learnt in the Falklands war were not lost on the world?s navies, particularly as the conflict demonstrated the leverage that newer weapons could offer even a small opponent confronting a naval power. Accordingly, naval planners increasingly emphasized reliance upon a diverse means of defensive measures, including the application of stealthy ?low observable? technologies in shaping and materials to reduce the radar signature return of surface vessels; long range early warning coupled with long-range engagement of air and missile threats; and finally, close-in gun and rapidly blooming chaff deployment to defeat aircraft and missiles in terminal ?end-game? engagements.
Despite such efforts, encounters in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and finally, the Gulf War of 1991, have reaffirmed the continued vulnerability of surfaces forces precision air and missile attack. Ships offer little protection against the sophisticated aerial attacker armed with precision ammunition. In single day in 1988, U.S. naval aviation and surface forces sank over half the Iranian navy, thanks to the leverage offered by naval aviation forces armed with laser-guided bombs and antishipping missiles.
The Gulf War of 1991 left memorable images of bombs flying through doors and elevator shafts, and cruise missiles literally cruising down streets. While to most observers, the war consisted of an air campaign against Iraqi leadership and military force targets; there was a strong maritime warfare component to the Gulf crises and subsequent war as well. From the onset, long-range maritime patrol aircraft worked with surface vessels to impose a tight blockade over Iraqi merchant traffic attempting to transit the Straits of Hormuz. During the war itself, there were sporadic actions by coalition attackers against Iraqi fleet elements. Naval aircraft and helicopters from the coalition navies savaged the Iraqi navy, which ultimately played no useful role in the war.
The Future
Because of the twin revolution of the submarine and the airplane, it is impossible for surface naval forces to operate with the assurance and the confidence that they are masters of their own fate, as was true in previous centuries. Contemporary post-Falklands British doctrine state that:
?The minimal requirement for a successful [maritime] operation is a favorable air situation. Air superiority will be a requirement for sea control where a robust challenge from the air is possible. Air supremacy is a necessary precondition of command of the sea.? [Emphasis in original text]
As the first millenium of the Common Era was one of predominant land power (typified by Rome), and the second one of predominant sea power (typified by Great Britain), the third millenium is increasingly one characterized by the dominance of air and space warfare. In fact, the main form of power projection for both armies and navy is the air weapon.
Air power at sea has made its mark on naval warfare since the time of the First World War. While currently the U.S. is the only truly global naval power (as it is the only truly global air power), the proliferation of increasingly sophisticated weapons among smaller nations in unstable regions offers no confidence to those who would blithely assume that American maritime supremacy will remain unchallenged, particularly in far-flung regional contingency operations. As the Second World War clearly showed the vulnerability of surface ships to attackers armed with ?dumb? weapons, the wars since the 1960?s have increasingly highlighted how even more valuable surface vessels are to attack by precision missile and bombs. Concern over missiles and mines and their successors threaten to constrain both the traditional freedom of maneuver of surface naval forces and options regarding their use.
Various forecaster and historian have attempted to predict the future of maritime warfare in light of the challenges posed by, older antishipping technology and weaponry. One favorite has been submarines Hoistorian John Keegan has stated that:
?It is with the submarine that the initiative and full freedom of the seas rests. The aircraft carrier, whatever realistic scenario of action is drawn ? that of operations in great waters or of amphibious support close to shore ? will be exposed to a wider range of threat than the submarine must face. In a shoreward context it risks attack not only by carrier-borne but also by land-based aircraft, land-based missile and the submarine itself?The era of the submarine as the predominant weapon of power at sea must therefore be recognized as having begun.?
Other vision for the future of submarines includes anti-radar stealth technology, lasers, electromagnetic rail guns, and sophisticated unmanned air vehicles to conduct maritime reconnaissance. It is not inconceivable that submarines might some day operate small-specialized piloted craft as well.
As for arsenal ships, it is hard to imagine how an arsenal ship, however well armed, could defeat a plethora of air-launched or submarine-launched weapons. History provides examples such as the Bismarck, Yamato, Mushasi, and Shinano, all who were arsenal ships of immense proportion who were sunk by air, surface or submarine forces.
The decline of the surface vessel as a predominate means of exerting naval power is undoubtedly underway. The decline may be slowed somewhat by new advances in shipboard defenses, but it is unlikely to be reversed.
Conclusion
Historically, the partnership between sea0based air and submarine forces, and land-based aviation has been the most productive means of thwarting an enemies attempt to seize local control of the sea. In fact, virtually all significant naval actions of this century have taken place within reach ? and with the involvement ? of land based aviation forces. In a post Cold War cost conscious environment, the advantages of having land-based aviation forces assume a greater role in maritime control operations is increasingly attractive to defense planners, particularly as the acquisition and operating costs of naval aviation are correspondingly increasingly expensive.
A number of circumstances have led to this. Fist, the costs for carrier based aircraft normally run three to four times as much as a land-based aircraft. Then come the lag times in deploying naval aviation forces, along with their need to replenish and resupply, which makes their ?presence? sporadic. Finally, the ratios of the large number of ships and personnel required to maintain a relatively small number of deployable strike aircraft is to high.
In conclusion, the pace and impact of aviation in the twentieth century has been extraordinary, and nowhere more so than in military affairs. Less than forty years after the Wright brothers flew at Kitty Hawk, the airplane ? both land- and sea-based- had evolved from threatening to dominating the ship. That dominance has been extended even more forcefully into the modern era in spite of intensive and creative efforts to improve shipboard defenses. In today?s world, the threat posed to the ship by the airplane or the aircraft-deployed missile or mine is at its greatest. If for no other reason than this, strengthening the traditional partnership of air forces and navies working together to ensure the defeat of their common enemies is no less important today than at any time earlier in this century.
Air Force and Maritime Operations; http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/tlallionpapers/airwarfare.maritimejune96.htm
Britain: The Leading Industrial, Commercial and Naval Power in the West; http://www.hkurst2.hkw.hk/firstyear/Cheong/cheongL01.htm
Christopher A. Preble, The Cold War Navy in the Post-Cold War World; http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-195.html
Land Powers in Competition with Sea Powres; http://www.informs.org/Comf/NO95/Talks/WB21.1.html
Frank Monoldo; Lessons from Kosovo; http://www.home.us.net/`fmm/articles/lessons_kosovo.htm
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Sea Battles; http://www.iconmarketing.co.uk/thagames/aws4.htm
Sea Power; http://www.acusd.edu/note/nsclasse/sea_power.html
Trends in Naval Power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean; http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/bulletin/96jan/si960101.html