The contemporary Croatian government led by Franjo Tudjman is comprised of both moderate and extreme nationalist factions (LeBor, 1994, p. 11). The policies of the Tudjman government are authoritarian and they are ultranationalist (LeBor, 1994, p. 11). The Tudjman government also provides funding for the Bosnian Croats in the conduct of ethnic cleansing campaigns against Muslims in Bosnian areas controlled by the Bosnian Croats (LeBor, 1994, p. 11). The Tudjman government restricts the freedom of the mass media, and attempts to expel Serbians from Croatia (LeBor, 1994, p. 11).
Recently, the Tudjman government made a decision “to scrap the Croatian dinar and replace it with the kuna, currency of the wartime Ustasha regime” (LeBor, 1994, p. 11). The fascist Ustase government that controlled Croatia during the Second World War “murdered Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies en masse” (LeBor, 1994, p. 11). The reinstatement of a fascist symbol by the Tudjman government represents a strengthening of the fascist element of the government (Roberts, 1994, pp. 1618).
Tudjman is a megalomaniac, although he is hardly charismatic (Banac, 1993, pp. 2021). Tudjman has, however, succeeded in creating a merging of his own identity with that of Croatia in both the domestic and international arenas. The Tudjman government has also used propaganda to arouse ordinary Croatians against the government’s enemies (Branson, 1991, p. 48). Thus, the Tudjman government appears to be trying hard to earn its fascist credentials.
A valid issue is how the Tudjman government in contemporary Croatia rates as either an ultranationalist or a fascist group. Within these contexts, the assessment of the Croatian government is as follows:
1. Ultranationalism:
a. The Tudjman government is strongly patriotic.
b. The Tudjman government is strongly chauvinistic.
c. The Tudjman government is highly insular.
d. The Tudjman government is highly exclusionary.
e. The Tudjman government does not avoid international interventionist activities.
2. Fascism:
a. The Tudjman government exercises authoritarian control.
b. Tudjman is not quite a charismatic leader; however, his identity has been successfully merged with that of Croatia.
c. Tudjman claims that Croatia is a model democracy; however, he operates as a virtual dictator.
d. The Tudjman government is strongly nationalistic.
e. The Tudjman government is strongly anticommunist.
f. The Tudjman government is antiliberal.
g. Tudjman claims that Croatia is a model democracy; however, Tudjman’s Democratic Union Party controls the government
although the party commands the support of only 25 percent of Croatians.
h. Tudjman’s government is essentially antiparliamentary party (see the preceding comment).
i. Tudjman gained power by capitalizing on popular discontent. Whether he will be willing to use force to retain political power remains to be seen.
j. Tudjman’s government is suspected of using both violence and terror in the destruction of rival political party facilities. The Tudjman government has used propaganda to attain political objectives.
k. The Tudjman government has displayed a tendency to disregard constitutional provisions and laws generally.
On balance, the Tudjman government in Croatia qualifies for designations as both an ultranationalist government and a fascist government. At present, Tudjman is enjoying greater success than has any Croatian fascist party of the past with the exception of the Ustase during the Second World War who were protected by the German and Italian armies.
Hungary
The Hungarian National Socialist Party, a fascist organization, was formed in 1937 (Palmer, 1970, p. 223). This party was virulently antiSemitic, and in this context was out of step with the other fascistlike rightwing parties in Hungary at the time (Palmer, 1970, p. 223). Hungary’s fascist government lasted through the Second World War.
Conditions in postcommunist Hungary provide a rich environment for the fostering of fascist thought. To be brief, in present day Hungary the economy is in as bad or worse shape than it was under the former Communist system (Holman, 1994, p. A12). In 1991, the most recent year for which accurate data are available, nonmanufacturing industrial activity accounted for 38 percent of Hungary’s gross domestic product (GDP), while manufacturing accounted for 28 percent, services for 20 percent, and agriculture 14 percent (Frydman, Rapaczynski, and Earle, 1993, p. 97). This structure places Hungary at some point between a Third World country and a developed economy within the context of the structure of production.
Inflation is high in Hungary. Prices rises have not slowed during the country’s postCommunist recession (Weidmann, 1993, pp. 104105). Doubledigit inflation in the twenties, doubledigit unemployment in the teens, and low wages have combined to create an economic nightmare for the majority of Hungarians.
Economic progress is not being accomplished in the context of growth in Hungary, the East European country with an economy closest to a western model. Economic growth averaged sixpercent per year in the 19711975 period, fourpercent in the 19761980 period, and onepercent in the 19811985 period. The 19861990 period witnessed an average onepercent per year decline in economic activity, and the decline in 1991 was three percent. In the first full year of reform in 1992, economic output plunged 11percent.
Converting macroeconomic data to more usable figures, the average monthly wage in Hungary approximates the equivalent of US$150 per month. A food basket (one loaf of breadone pound, one package of butterone pound, one liter of milk, six ounces of ham, one chocolate barfour ounce, and four bottles of beerone litercosts the approximate equivalent of US$4.15 in Hungary. Neither the macro nor the micro economic situation in contemporary Hungary is inviting or palatable. Inflation in 1994 is running at 22 percent and the unemployment rate is 12 percent (Williams, 1994, p. B5).
Stateowned enterprises and cooperatives continue to exist in Hungary, although the reform government, a coalition of the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats, that was defeated in the election in May 1994, has offered the more profitable stateowned enterprises to foreign interests at firesale prices (Torok, 1993, pp. 366384). The early giveaway of state assets under the reform government’s privatization program led to such public outcry that the State Property Agency was established to introduce some degree of equity and order into the process. Hungarians particularly resented to transfer of stateowned assets to foreign entities.
One outcome of privatization that has caused considerable public resentment is the reduction in the levels of unemployment compensation (Bonin, 1992, pp. 716732). The potential for this outcome to threaten the entire economic reform process was ignored by the reform government. In banking, privatization permitted foreign investor to come into the Hungarian economy and buy up all of the profitable industrial banking sectors (Moore, 1993, pp. 141143). The result is that the country’s retail banking sector has been allowed to languish, an outcome that has
resulted in additional public resentment toward the reform government.
Rightwing political activity in contemporary Hungary has some racist overtones. African, Arab, and Asian students are being attacked by skinhead gangs with increasing frequency (Attacks, 1192, p. 216). The skinheads are young people who carry “symbols of the Arrow Cross, Hungary’s 1940sera fascist group,” and affect s.s.style trappings” (Husarska, 1992, p. 10). As a consequence, many foreign students are leaving Hungary (Woodard, 1992, p. A48). This exodus contributes to the attainment of the goal of exclusion pursued by rightwing political groups in Hungary. Hungary is already a country with only two minority groups of any significant size. There are approximately halfamillion Gypsies and 80,000 Jews living in Hungary (Kenez, 1992, p. 6).
The primary “repository of nationalist thought is the CenterRight governing coalition” which is dominated by the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Kenez, 1992, p. 7). The Hungarian Democratic forum does not attempt to distinguish either the government or the party’s policies from the preSecond World War authoritarian government led by fascist Miklos Horthy (Kenez, 1992, p. 7). In fact, the current Hungarian government pursues highly nationalistic policies.
The chief rival of the Hungarian Democratic Forum for political power within the ruling Centerright coalition is a fascist group led by Istvan Csurka, who also acts as vicepresident of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Kenez, 1992, p. 7). Csurka advances views that are both antidemocratic and antiSemitic, and his group is both wildly anticommunist and antiliberal (Kenez, 1992, p. 7). Csurka’s group “vilify all their opponents with extraordinarily passion, often in language hardly suitable for decent political discourse. They portray them as traitors” (Kenez, 1992, p. 7).
At present, the Hungarian media, although managed by the government, presents a balance in political discourse. Csurka’s group denounces this balanced approach. As a consequence, Jozsef Antall, Hungarian Prime Minister and leader of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, attempted to remove the responsible ministers. The ministers refused to resign, and Antall encountered constitutional roadblocks that prevented the removal of the ministers. Csurka, the fascist leader, has demand that the ministers be removed from their offices by force (Kenez, 1992, p. 8).
One troublesome issue concerns the motivation for the Hungarian Democratic Forum to keep Csurka’s group within the governing CenterRight coalition. The general assessment is that Csurka’s ideas appeal to a significantlysized faction within the coalition (Kenez, 1992, p. 8). Csurka thinks this support is in the 70 to 80 percent range (Husarska, 1992, p. 10). In January 1993, however, Antall defeated Csurka for the leadership of the Centerright coalition (Steady, 1993, p. 48).
Both Csurka and Antall frequently refer to a Hungarian nation of 15 million persons. Hungary’s population is only 10 million. Csurka and Antall, however, include the five million Hungarians residing in neighboring nations who were displaced from Hungary by the provisions of the Trianon Peace Treaty in 1920, as action that reaffirmed by the Yalta Agreement in 1945 (Husarska, 1992, p. 10). Both Antall and Csurka note that the Yalta Agreement expires in 1995, and echo Hitler’s call for lebensraum for Germans in the 1930s by demanding living space for Hungarians in the late1990s (Husarska, 1992, p. 10).
Antall lost the prime ministership in Hungary in early1994; however, Csurka did not succeed him in that office (Ingram, 1994, p. 8). The caretaker prime minister is Peter Boross, an open admirer of Hungary’s fascist prime minister from 1920 through 1944, Nicholas Horthy (Ingram, 1994, p. 8).
A valid issue is how the Centerright coalition government in contemporary Hungary, along with the political organization led by Csurka, rates as either ultranationalist or fascist groups. Within these contexts, the assessment of the Hungarian political environment is as follows:
1. Ultranationalism:
a. Both the government and Csurka’s group are strongly patriotic.
b. Both the government and Csurka’s group are strongly chauvinistic.
c. Csurka’s group is highly insular; the government is less so.
d. Csurka’s group is highly exclusionary; the government is less so.
e. Neither the government nor Csurka’s group avoids international interventionist activities, as both groups demand the return of the territories of surrounding nations in which large concentrations of ethnic Hungarians reside. 2. Fascism:
a. The government attempts to exercise authoritarian control; Csurka’s group advocates such control.
b. Neither Antall, Boross, nor Csurka can be described as a charismatic leader.
c. The coalition government attempts to stifle opposition; Csurka would use force to stifle political opponents.
d. Both the government and Csurka’s group are strongly nationalistic.
e. Both the government and Csurka’s group are strongly anticommunist.
f. Both the government and the Csurka group are antiliberal.
g. The coalition government claims to be democratic in character; however, there is doubt that the CenterRight coalition would relinquish power without a fight. Csurka deplores democracy.
h. The government shows antipathy toward parliamentary parties, while the Csurka group is openly antiparliamentary party.
i. The government has given no indications of what actions it would take to remain in power. Csurka advocates the violent seizure of power.
j. Neither the government nor Csurka’s group has been linked directly with the use of violence and terror. Both the government and Csurka’s group, however, have used propaganda to attain political objectives.
k. The coalition government has displayed a willingness to disregard constitutional provisions and laws generally, although the government has attained only limited success through such tactics. Csurka openly advocates the disregard of constitutional provisions and laws generally.
On balance, both the CenterRight coalition government in Hungary and the Csurkaled group qualify for designations as both ultranationalist organizations and fascist organizations. At present, the Hungarian political situation is in a state of disarray; however, individuals with both fascist and ultranationalist leanings appear to be gaining the upper hand.
SerbiaIn 1911, a Serbian secret society, the Black Hand, was formed (Palmer, 1970, pp. 81, 112). Another name for the Black Hand was Ujedinjenje ili Smrt, which means unity or death. The Black Hand was an ultranationalist organization whose main objective was Serbian independence from AustriaHungary. The Black Hand organization also was characterized by fascist tendencies, such as a military structure and participation in ritual (Palmer, 1970, p. 112). The Black Hand “imposed bloodcurdling oaths of obedience and anonymity,” and “operated with . . . sinister secrecy” (Palmer, 1970, p. 113). The Bosnian student that assassinated the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo in 1914 and precipitated the First World War was supplied arms by agents of the Black Hand (Palmer, 1970, p. 117).
The AustriaHungarian Empire tended to treat the Balkan nations as so many backward provinces (Palmer, 1970, pp. 103120). Serbia in particular was treated as a backward, provincial state that was not worthy of consideration by civilized society (Robbins, 1984, p. 3). It is hardly surprising, thus, that the Black Hand organization was formed in that country, and that the organization played a major role in the assassination in Sarajevo, and in the fermenting of hostility against AustriaHungary. Subsequent to the assassination, the AustroHungarian demands on Serbia were both unrealistic and demeaning (Buchan, 1991, p. 17). It is hardly surprising that Serbia refused to accept two of the conditions that AustriaHungary attempted to impose.
Fascists, however, were never the dominant political force in Serbia. When the Yugoslav federation was taking shape following the end of the First World War, the Serbian Social Democrats refused to cooperate with the rightwing parties in the establishment of a Yugoslav parliament, and took the lead in unifying socialist groups (Pavlowitch, 1971, p. 77). Socialists, communists, and Serbians eventually dominated the Yugoslav political scene.
In the aftermath of the breakup of the Yugoslav federation subsequent to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the Serbians were generally painted as the personification of evil, while the Croatians, Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims, and other nationalities were portrayed as victims. In actual fact, ethnic cleansing was practiced first by the Croatians and the Bosnian Muslims against Serbians living in Croatia and Bosnia. The western world generally ignored these ethnic cleansing activities because the Serbians were generally unrepentant socialists, while the other nationalities were generally moving in a rightist political and economic direction. When the Serbians began to fight back and began to engage in ethnic cleansing activities against the Croatians and Bosnian Muslims, however, the western world took note, and have been denouncing the Serbians ever since.
None of the above explanation is an excuse for the horrors committed by the Bosnian Serbians. The above explanation, however, provides an insight into the reasons that Serbians feel that they are treated unfairly by the international community.