A second threat resulting from the security dilemma is it causes states to arm themselves beyond security needs. One way in which action has been taken to reduce the number of nuclear weapons has been through the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START). With the signing of the first START (Strategic Arms Reduction) treaty in 1991, the United States and Russia committed to making major cuts in their nuclear forces. The START agreements set limits on the number of warheads that each nation can deploy on strategic (intercontinental) nuclear weapons. These agreements also require the destruction of a large number of long-range delivery systems such as missiles, submarines, and bombers. Under START I, the United States is reducing its deployed strategic nuclear arsenal from the 1990 level of about 13,000 warheads to about 8,500. Russia will reduce its deployed strategic warheads from roughly 11,000 to about 6,500. In January 1993, the United States and Russia signed the START II treaty, in which they agreed to cut their deployed strategic forces to 3,500 warheads apiece. This treaty also bans the deployment of land-based missiles with more than one warhead. Although the START treaties are currently only with Russia, the fact that Russia is decreasing its nuclear arsenal should give some added security to the non-Russian Republics. This would eliminate their loss of security through the security dilemma. Again, the central issues of security and power, the motivations in modern realism, are the main target of the START treaties. In order to completely rid the Soviet Republics of this aspect of the security dilemma, the START treaties must be extended to the non-Russian Republics. Unfortunately for the United States, it missed a valuable opportunity to extend the START treaties. In 1992 Secretary of State Baker toured the Soviet Republics. He told the leadership of each republic that Washington would not recognize them unless they adhered to all treaties concerning nuclear and conventional weapons that the former Soviet Union had signed. Unfortunately, the administration bowed to criticism from democrats that Bush and Baker were not recognizing the post-Soviet republics fast enough. The administration then acted hastily and developed a policy that was not strategically sound. The United States now had diplomatic relations with each of the fifteen Soviet Republics, even though only Russia had signed and ratified the various arms control treaties. In order to enforce the START treaties, United States would then have to start actively policing the Soviet Republics. Policing would require some type of military presence in the Soviet Republics. But this overreaching by the United States might be perceived by the Soviet Republics to harbor hostile intentions, therefore yielding a security dilemma and a spiral of hostilities.
In order to overcome the threats brought about by the poor economic state in regards to the selling of nuclear weapons and stockpiles from state to state the United States must actively enforce the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This treaty was established in 1968 and was recognized by many countries including the Soviet Union. The NPT barred acquisition of nuclear weapons by nonnuclear states and forbade nuclear states to export their capabilities to other nations. This policy deals directly with the states, where it groups countries as a whole in order to grant them security. It also focuses on one of the central problems recognized by modern realists, the conditions of peace. Again, the United States lost its window of opportunity to have the non-Russian states ratify the NPT in the same fiasco as the START treaties. So until the United States can get the NPT ratified by the non-Russian Republics, the threat will remain.
In another area of economic decline in the Soviet Republics, there emerges the hair-trigger threat. There are two possible solutions in dealing with this threat. One is to deal with the economic causes, and the other is to deal with the military causes. Since the economic causes are going to be explored in depth on the next threat, I will choose to discuss the pending military problems that bring about the hair-trigger situation. In order to remove the hair-trigger threat a process needs to be instituted called de-alerting. De-alerting would move to extend the time needed to prepare nuclear weapons for launch by hours, days, or weeks. Doing so could prevent small conflicts or misunderstandings from falling prey to the nuclear hair trigger and erupting into nuclear war. De-alerting would provide time for cooler heads to prevail. It would work to improve US-Russian relations by reducing tensions; promoting stability; enhancing safety, safeguards, and security; supporting traditional arms control; and saving money. One method of de-alerting is given by Bruce Blair. Blair’s proposal has emerged from comprehensive talks with Russian specialists and uses an equitable and symmetrical approach to: drastically restrain the most lethal counterforce weapons, increase transparency- allowing for easy verification, dramatically cut the number of strategic warheads configured for launch on warning, and create a de-alerted arsenal that would be slow to reverse. This solution approaches the threat from a modern realist position. It performs on the state level, and is centrally motivated by national interests, security, and power.
Finally, there is the threat of nuclear terrorism brought about by the poor economic state. This appears to be the only threat with a solution based on the Global Society model. The programs enacted to solve this threat are directed toward monetary and economic aid. These “Nunn-Lugar” programs (named for Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, who initiated them in 1992) provide the former Soviet nations with financial and technical assistance. These programs, often called cooperative threat reduction [CTR] programs, are established to facilitate the elimination, and the safe and secure transportation and storage, of nuclear, chemical and other weapons and their delivery vehicles; to facilitate the safe and secure storage of fissile materials derived from the elimination of nuclear weapons; to prevent the proliferation of weapons, weapons components and weapons related technology and expertise; and to expand military to military and defense contacts. There are numerous ways in which the Nunn-Lugar programs follows the Global Society model. First it was formed in order to curtail the actions of certain terrorists, which are on the sub-state, individual, level of analysis. Second, it takes into account a broad agenda of social, economic, and environmental issues, which are central problems in the Global Society model.
Conclusion
My objective in the paper is to find out which international relations theories motivated United States foreign policy with regard to nuclear proliferation in the Soviet Republics. It was my belief that the United States’ foreign policy is mainly influenced by the Global Society/Complex Interdependence model of international relations. Contrasting my original hypothesis, was my secondary hypothesis, which states that United States foreign policy is mainly influenced by a Modern Realist model of international relations. It appears that in order to get the best answer to the question, neither hypothesis is sufficient. Both models of international relations significantly influence United States foreign policy. Even though the realist argument was used in more policies, it was the Global Society argument that was implemented with the most confidence. Ultimately, which policy is to be used seems to be decided on a case to case basis, determined by the specific problem at hand.
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